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Abstract
In Chapter 1 I briefly introduce the issues that will be studied in Chapter 2 and 3. In
Chapter 2 I introduce a macroprudential policy for the cap on debt-to-income (DTI) ratio in
a model which is estimated over the period of the build-up of household debt occurred in US
before the financial crisis. The optimal macroprudential policy requires a more important role
for labor income in credit supply decision and a strong countercyclical response of the cap on DTI
to household debt. I find that this optimal macroprudential policy is successful in stabilizing
household debt, is beneficial in terms of social welfare and is desirable as a complement for
monetary policy, when this is enforced as a standard Taylor rule. I then consider also a monetary
policy that can ”lean against the wind” of a credit boom to pursue financial stability. It turns out
that this policy is welfare-dominated by the strategy of assigning this goal to a macroprudential
authority committing to optimally implementing the cap on DTI. However, the best-performing
policy is a combination of ”leaning against the wind” strategy and macroprudential policy.
In Chapter 3 I study optimal government spending and monetary policy in an economy hit
by a liquidity shock, which may generate recession and deflation. I find that the optimal policy
mix implies a money-financed fiscal stimulus, which is shaped as a one-period countercyclical
fiscal stimulus along with a prolonged central bank’s balance-sheet expansion. By comparing
this optimal policy with other suboptimal policies we uncover several facts. First, an unconven-
tional monetary policy performs unambiguously better when accompanied by a fiscal stimulus.
Second, financing the stimulus with only public debt brings about long-lasting recession and
deflation. Third, ”active” monetary policies, like the standard Taylor rule, ”inflation targeting”
and ”nominal GDP targeting” are efficient policies if the increase in money supply brought
about by these policies is complemented with an optimal fiscal stimulus.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The thesis is composed by two papers, each dealing with the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
However, the time of the two is different, as they refer to two distinct phases of the financial
crisis. Specifically, Chapter 2 deals with the phase occurring prior to the burst of the crisis, and
thus is related to the policy prescriptions that monetary authority is called upon to undertake
in order to avert harmful consequences when the crisis actually explodes. Chapter 3 instead
focuses on the phase subsequent to the crisis explosion and therefore when monetary policy is
called upon to put in place policies aimed at dampening the negative effects caused by the crisis,
that are recession and deflation.
Hence, my research deals with two policy prescriptions that, if undertaken, could have prevented
the worst of the crisis to happen (in Chapter 2) and might help to end recession and bring the
economy back to growth (in Chapter 3).
The actual financial crisis has given rise to many debates concerning the opportunity of
introducing a particular policy aimed at preserving the economic system as a whole, in order
to protect it against systemic risks: this policy is better known with the name of ”macropru-
dential”1. In fact, since the years immediately following the burst of the financial crisis, many
prestigious economists (for instance Blanchard et al. (2013)[10] have urged the necessity to
”rethink” macroeconomic policy so that it may encompass even ”prudential” issues2. Therefore,
1 Macroprudential policy is defined ”a policy that uses primarily prudential tools to limit systemic or system-
wide financial risk, thereby limiting the incidence of disruptions in the provision of key financial services that can
have serious consequences for the real economy, by dampening the build-up of financial imbalances and building
defences that contain the speed and sharpness of subsequent downswings and their effects on the economy;
identifying and addressing common exposures, risk concentrations, linkages and interdependencies that are sources
of contagion and spillover risks that may jeopardize the functioning of the system as a whole” ( Financial Stability
Board, Bank for International Settlements and International Monetary Fund (2011) [27]).
2There exists a large number of papers originated from the increasing interest in the measures studied to avoid
a new burst of a financial crisis like the one experienced some years ago. Many of them analyse the measures
put ahead by the Basel III committee, established with the primary goal of ensuring the stability of the banking
system. See Introduction in Chapter 2 for some references.
in light of the detrimental consequences of the crisis, it has been evenly acknowledged that pri-
mary goal of authorities should be that of monitoring financial stability. However, there is no
unanimous consensus about which should be the authority in charge of financial stability.
In this regard, many commentators have called into question the standard role of monetary
policy, arguing that central banks could do also the job of safeguarding financial stability. Ac-
cording to this view, central bank could ”lean against the wind” of a credit boom, raising the
policy rate to cushion the leveraging growth and thus prevent systemic risk.
Oppositely, there is the view suggesting that the role of financial stability should be assigned
to a macroprudential authority designed on purpose, which establishes macroprudential rules
with the goal of monitoring financial stability. In this case, macroprudential policies would be
a complement of the standard conduct of monetary policy.
In Chapter 2, I challenge this latter view, investigating the impact of a specific macroprudential
policy like the countercyclical cap on debt-to-income ratio (DTI). Drawing an economy that
may experience a credit boom as occurred in US before the crisis, where the extraordinary
high level of household debt has been driven by growth in house prices, I assess whether this
macroprudential instrument would help pursue financial stability or if instead this task would
be better achieved by monetary policy. With my research I seek to judge whether, in case of a
credit boom, complementing monetary policy with a well-designed macroprudential policy like
the countercyclical cap on DTI would be beneficial or not for the economy.
In Chapter 3 I study the stabilization effect of a specific macroeconomic policy - a money-
financed fiscal stimulus - a policy that has now regained new interest and appeal.
After the turmoil caused by the burst of the financial crisis and in order to bolster the economy,
central banks decided to promptly intervene by adopting large scale asset purchases, injecting
huge amount of monetary base in the system in order to stimulate the economy. However, it
is common knowledge that these measures have not been as successful as expected in bringing
output back to potential levels and inflation to the target, in countries like Japan and also in
the Eurozone3.
Unconventional monetary policies worldwide have not been accompanied with expansionary
fiscal policy, owing to the increasing fears of too-high levels of public debt, that instead have led
to pursue policies aimed at reducing it4. This occurs in spite of the fact that a large strand of
3In this regard, Bank of Japan’s chief Harada argued that, in spite of the large-scale implementation of
unconventional monetary policies, Japanese recovery is still weak, as output has increased little and inflation has
stagnated (see ”Economic Activity and Prices in Japan, and Monetary Policy”, speech at a meeting with business
leaders in Yamaguchi Prefecture, April 13th 2013). Furthermore, a recent Bank of Japan’s document reports
that the expected year-to-year CPI is likely to be negative or close to zero for time being until the end of 2016
(”Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (July 2016)”).
4As for Japan, one one of the ”arrows” of Prime minister Abe’s program is indeed fiscal consolidation.
the prominent monetary economics’ literature has unambiguously proven that when policy rates
have reached the zero lower bound fiscal policy becomes more effective (Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2011)[15], Eggertson (2010)[22] Eggertson and Krugman (2012)[23]).
Therefore, as a consequence of this gloomy scenario, some commentators have begun advocating
another unorthodox monetary policy measure, consisting in financing a fiscal stimulus, and thus
the implied increase in deficit, with issuance of money, without relying on public-debt financing5.
This idea, which dates back to the famous ”helicopter money” (Friedman (1969)[28]), was revived
more recently, when Japan fell in a liquidity trap in the 90’s. One of the most prominent advocate
of this idea at that time was the former Fed chief Ben Bernanke [8], who had a speech in 2003 in
which he argued for an expansionary fiscal policy ”explicitly coupled with incremental Bank of
Japan purchases of government debt”, so that the expansion of deficit would be in effect financed
by money creation6. He also said that a fiscal stimulus which is ”accommodated by a program
of open-market purchases to alleviate any tendency for interest rates to increase, would almost
certainly be an effective stimulant to consumption and hence to prices”. According to this view,
this policy measure should have a ”double effect”, in the sense that the stimulus to demand
brought about by the expansionary fiscal policy would be reinforced by a specific monetary
policy pointed to keep the interest rate low so as to exacerbate the aggregate demand stimulus7.
This fascinating idea has been recently formalized by Gal`ı (2017)[30], who has built a standard
New Keynesian DSGE model to show that this policy has indeed beneficial effects, both in terms
of the fiscal multiplier and in terms of welfare. In his paper, money-financed fiscal stimulus is
introduced as a policy rule, which is implicitly based on a strong commitment treasury-central
bank.
Building on these insights, my research question is to investigate whether a money-financed
fiscal stimulus becomes, in fact, an optimal policy, among the various alternatives a policymaker
can make use of. In other words, I am interested in evaluating whether an optimal commitment
treasury-central bank involves indeed a money-financed fiscal stimulus, in case of a shock that
may lead to deep recession and deflation.
5Although object of the chapter is not that of discussing the way it could be implemented, I point out that, due
to the recent facts, the most viable way to adopt this policy to date might be the case of a specific commitment
between government and central bank, such that the fiscal stimulus put ahead by the government is financed
by issuance of government bonds in the secondary market and these are purchased by central bank according
to a program of ”unconventional monetary policy” (this policy can be called ”quantitative easing plus fiscal
stimulus”). The final outcome of this process is that the increase in fiscal deficit is in fact accompanied by
expansion of monetary base. Gal`ı (2017)[30] stressed that a money-financed fiscal stimulus may give rise to legal
problems, because such policy may undermine central bank’s independence, one the soundest pillars of the current
economic system.
6In another speech in 2002 Bernanke said that a ”money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Friedman’s
famous ”helicopter drop” of money” (Bernanke (2002) [7]).
7For more references on the idea of money-financed fiscal stimulus see the Introduction of Chapter 3.
4Chapter 2
Macroprudential Cap on
Debt-to-Income Ratio and Monetary
Policy
2.1 Introduction
A wide range of papers in the post-crisis literature argue that one of the most important cause
of the financial crisis is the huge build-up in households debt which occurred before the burst of
the crisis. Several studies have also underlined the connection of high levels of households debt
with the turmoil subsequent to the crisis1.
This fact has called into question the stance of monetary policy over the years prior to the crisis.
It is known that the Fed did not react to the extraordinarily high accumulation of household
debt that took place before the crisis. Contrasting this stance, many commentators argue that
central bank should have done something to avoid such large accumulation of debt: thus, it came
the proposal of ”leaning against the wind” of over-borrowing, according to which Fed should
have raised the interest rate to break the credit boom. Some others instead believe that the best
option would be the implementation of macroprudential policies designed with the purpose of
safeguarding financial stability, so that central bank would remain engaged in its primary goal
of inflation targeting (”two instruments for two goals”).
In this regard, several macroprudential policies can be used to pursue financial stability2. In this
1For instance, Glick and Lansing (2010) [32] prove that there exits a negative correlation between the overall
amount of households debt prior to the crisis and consumption levels thereafter, emphasising the burden of
private debt on the recovery prospectives. Some other, as Mian and Sufi (2010) [56], instead observe the positive
correlation arising in US between growth in household debt and unemployment rate, thus demonstrating the
detrimental effect of excessive values of household debt.
2For a complete treatment of macroprudential instruments and its related literature refer to IMF(2013)[29],
Bank of England(2011) [61] and Financial Stability Board, Bank for International Settlements and International
paper we study the macroeconomic consequences of the using the cap on debt-to-income ratio
as a macroprudential instrument. The idea to move the cap on DTI in a countercyclical way
arises precisely with the purpose of avoiding a new build-up of private leveraging that would
undermine the financial system and presumably lead to a new financial crisis. This explains why
this tool is ”macroprudential”, in the sense that it aims at protecting against systemic risks.
Some recent empirical evidence has documented that this macroprudential policy is effective in
restricting the amount of loans that can be requested and is expected to smooth the credit cycle
so as to yield greater resilience of households and a lower probability of default3.
With this paper we investigate several aspects of this macroprudential instrument. Firstly, we
ask whether the implementation of the macroprudential cap on debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is
beneficial for the economy and ensures financial stability. Secondly, we focus on the relation
with monetary policy, assessing whether implementing a macroprudential cap on DTI increases
the effectiveness of the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, we answer to the main question of
the research: should we adopt macroprudential policy during a credit boom or instead we can
call for a more important role of monetary policy ?
We proceed as follows. We estimate a DSGE model over the years before the crisis, when the
growth of household debt-to-GDP ratio has taken place. The model is built so as to explain
the credit boom, so that big emphasis is on one of the main determinant of the credit boom,
i.e. the housing prices boom. In fact, it is widely recognized in the literature that the soar
in household debt has been accompanied by a huge increase in house prices. This is shown in
Figure 2.1: it can be clearly seen that the growth of households debt as a percentage of gross
disposable income (solid blue line) has been tracked quite well by the increase in house prices
(dashed black line) until the end of 2005. Crucially, since we are interested in the credit boom
phase, in the paper we consider data series ranging from 1991:3 through 2005:4. In this sam-
ple, the correlation between household debt-to-disposable income and house prices amounts to
0.9953, implying that these two series have strongly moved in the same direction over the period
considered4. Importantly, the soar of these two variables noticeably outweighed the increase in
both consumption and real wages, thus rendering the credit boom a clear event.
As in other papers dealing with the credit boom, we model an economy featuring a collateral
borrowing constraint. The borrowing constraint we propose represents a novelty. In the liter-
Monetary Fund (2009) [26].
3Refer, among the others, to Jacome and Mitra (2015) [38] Lim at al. (2011) [50], IMF (2013) [29], Vanden-
bussche et al.(2012) [78], Shim et al. (2013) [69].
4 Concerning the strong relation between house prices and household debt, several authors ( Justiniano et al.
(2015) [41], Dynan (2012) [20], Mian and Sufi (2011) [57], Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) [64], Hatzius (2008) [35],
Shiller (2007) [68] ) argue that main cause of the credit boom is the huge appreciation of real estate values that,
through appreciation of the collateral, fuelled credit supply. According to this view, main responsible of the soar
in household debt is therefore the ”valuation” of real estate values. In this paper, we consider this factor as the
one which gives rise to the credit boom phase.
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Figure 2.1: Households debt as a percentage of gross disposable income is obtained by summing
the series ”Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Consumer Credit” (HCCSDODNS) to
”Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Home Mortgages” (HMLBSHNO) and dividing the
sum by ”Real Disposable Income” (DPIC96). The series of house prices is the Standard and
Poor/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA). Consumption is the series
Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCECC96). Wages is the series Nonfarm Business
Sector: Real compensation per hours (COMPRNFB). Both are indexed so that 1980=100.
1979:Q4-2016:Q1. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
ature, liquidity constraints are usually designed such that borrowing is either collateralized to
real estate values (see Iacoviello (2005) [36]) or instead is backed by current-period labor income
(Mendoza (2002) [55]). Importantly, in this paper we combine the two, so that the amount of
debt borrowers are allowed to take on is tied to both their real estate values and their labor
income. We think that this is a realistic feature as it more closely resembles what happens in
practice in credit supply decision. Estimating the model over the years of the pre-crisis credit
boom reveals that borrowers has been almost entirely tied to real estate values, leaving only a
marginal role to borrowers’ labor income. This implies that the amount of household debt has
been strictly connected to the upswings occurred in the housing market before the crisis.
Building on this scenario, we introduce the macroprudential policy of our interest. Importantly,
we depart from the literature in the sense that the macroprudential policy involves two pol-
icy instruments. The first policy instrument is the standard countercyclical reaction of the
macroprudential instrument to the deviation of financial variables around the steady state. In
our framework this implies that the cap on debt-to-income is assumed to react to deviation of
household debt in a countercyclical fashion. The second instrument has to do instead with the
way credit supply is implemented in the economy. Specifically, we assume that the authority
may establish to what extent borrowers’ variables can be pledged when requesting new debt.
In other words, the authority may affect whether household debt has to be tied to standard
collateral values, like real estate values, or instead to borrowers’ labor income. By this virtue,
we conjecture that, given the pre-crisis experience, it may well be the case the that a macropru-
dential authority may find it desirable to reduce the incidence of collateral values and therefore
increase the one of labor income5.
Thus, by optimizing these two macroprudential instruments, we find that the optimal macro-
prudential policy involves a larger incidence of labor income in credit supply decision which
leads to a less pronounced impact of the financial amplification mechanism. Importantly, this
policy produces an improvement in social welfare and greater financial stability with respect
to the estimated model. We show that a compelling general equilibrium effect is the fact that
the presence of this macroprudential policy reflects into an increase in the ”shadow price” of
borrowing (or the marginal cost of borrowing), which discourages households from requesting
new debt.
Our analysis allows to focus on the coexistence of macroprudential policy and monetary policy,
and to draw important implications concerning the conduct of the latter during a credit boom.
In particular, we consider three cases of interaction monetary-macroprudential policy. In the
first, monetary policy is in form of a standard Taylor rule, such that central bank may react to
movements in inflation rate and output. We therefore assume that both authorities coordinate
so as to optimally search for their respective policies. Result is that a standard Taylor-type mon-
etary policy rule performs unambiguously better in stabilizing the economy when accompanied
with the macroprudential cap on DTI. In the second exercise, we allow monetary policy to take
into account also financial variables, so that central bank can implement the policy of ”leaning
against the wind”, namely raising the policy rate to tackle the soar of household debt. In this
way we are able to compare the ”leaning against the wind” policy with the strategy of ”two
instruments for two goals”. Remarkably, we obtain that this latter strategy delivers higher social
welfare. Finally, we consider the case of a combined policy that puts bigger effort in stabilizing
household debt: the policy of ”leaning against the wind” is complemented with macroprudential
policy. This policy turns out to be the best-performing one in terms of social welfare and in
stabilizing household debt. Importantly, the most effective stabilization of household debt comes
at the cost of larger variability in output gap and inflation, thus implying that in a credit boom
the standard objectives of monetary policy should ”lend a hand” to financial stability.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents our benchmark model, that is the one
in which there is no macroprudential policy. Section 2.3 reports the estimation details. The
macroprudential instrument of our interest is illustrated in Section 2.4, where we show also
5From a practical point of view, we speculate that this can be achieved by a specific regulation of banking
sector.
its welfare implications. Section 2.5 focuses on the interaction between monetary policy and
macroprudential policy. Section 2.6 discusses other issues related to our macroprudential policy.
Section 2.7 summarizes results and concludes.
2.1.1 Related literature
The paper is mostly related to works that investigate the welfare effects of macroprudential
policies, also in interaction with the optimal conduct of monetary policy. Kannan et al. (2012)
[42] build a model with financial accelerator mechanism that produces credit boom and growth
in house prices and show that implementing a macroprudential policy improves macroeconomic
stability, if the macroprudential instrument is specifically targeted to reduce credit cycles and
the economy is hit by financial shocks. They use a macroprudential policy designed as a rule
according to which central bank reacts to increasing levels of debt. Lambertini et al. (2013)
[49] study the potential benefits of rules for the loan-to-value (LTV) in a model in which the
build-up of borrowing is motivated by news shocks. Main result is that for this macroprudential
policy to be optimal, the loan-to-value must react to financial variables in a countercyclical
way. Carrasco-Galego and Rubio (2014) [14] show with a general equilibrium model that the
coordination between a macroprudential policy like the countercyclical LTV rule and monetary
policy is welfare-improving for the society. Angelini et al. (2012) [1] use ad-hoc loss function
to show that when an economy is affected by financial shocks (i.e. when the economy is not in
”normal times”) a countercyclical LTV rule (or countercyclical capital requirement) is effective
in stabilizing output if this policy is implemented in cooperation with monetary policy. They
conclude that macroprudential policies may complement the stabilization role provided by mon-
etary policy.
Importantly, none of these papers deals with the macroprudential instrument of our interest: the
countercyclical cap on debt-to-income ratio. With the present paper we also seek to fill this gap.
Furthermore, the framework we propose allows also a comparison and a combination between
this macroprudential policy and the standard LTV policy, discussed in the above papers.
The idea of adopting macroprudential policies has been also deeply motivated in general equilib-
rium models. The prominent literature that has been studying this issue argues that collateral
constraints drive to a ”pecuniary externality”, as agents do not internalize the consequences
of borrowing on the aggregate economy (see, among the others, Bianchi (2011) [9], Mendoza
(2002) [55], Benigno et al. (2011) [4]). This negative externality can be tackled by adopting
macroprudential policies, as these measures help prevent over-borrowing.
From a modelling perspective, the paper is related to works that assign a role to housing both as
a durable good and as collateral for borrowers. In this field, Iacoviello (2005)[36] builds a mon-
etary business cycles model featuring housing in the utility function and heterogeneous agents,
where entrepreneurs are subject to a liquidity constraint tied to real estate values. His estimates
show that housing preference shock leads to a financial accelerator mechanism through the col-
lateral constraint, which allows to match the positive response of nominal spending observed
on US data. Iacoviello and Neri (2010)[37] estimate a DSGE model with housing in the utility
function to show that housing demand shock is an important driver of the business cycle. By
the same token, Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2016)[34] add occasionally-binding liquidity constraint
and zero lower bound to a similar model, showing that housing preference shocks lead to an
asymmetric impact, depending on whether the shock is positive or negative. We propose a
model that shares some important features with these works, like housing in the utility function
and the presence of savers and borrowers. However, main departure is that we include a role
for labor income in credit supply decision. Liu et al. (2013)[51] introduce a collateral constraint
in firms’ investment decision to account for the positive comovement between land prices and
business investment. Favilukis et al. (2010)[25] combine collateral constraint with both idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate business cycle risk to show the impact of relaxing the collateral constraint
on the propagation of shocks.
Finally, this paper is more broadly related to works that have assigned a primary role to financial
shocks and financial friction in explaining the Great Recession. Some relevant examples include
Del Negro et al. (2011)[19], Jermann and Quadrini (2012),[40], Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2014)[16].
2.2 The model
In this section we describe the baseline model, which does not involve the macroprudential policy
object of our analysis6. This model represents the benchmark of our analysis, which is needed
in order to compare the effect of the implementation of the macroprudential instrument.
We set up a model that is able to replicate the progressive accumulation of debt and the soar
in house prices that took place in US in the years pre-crisis (see Figure 2.1). The model is
a New Keynesian DSGE model featuring borrowers and savers, where borrowers face a credit
constraint in which the amount of borrowing depends on real estate value (standard lending
collateral) and borrowers’ labor income. This last feature makes a role for the macroprudential
policy of our interest7.
In the economy there exists a continuum of households, split between savers and borrowers.
6The macroprudential cap on debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is introduced in Section 2.4.
7For a seminal work on collateral credit constraint see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) [45].
Throughout we label with ”s” the savers and ”b” the borrowers. They differ for the discount
factor, as borrowers are more impatient so that they discount future at a lower discount factor:
βb < βs. Savers and borrowers’ maximization problem are object of the following subsections.
2.2.1 Savers
Savers are provided with the following life-time expected utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtszt
[
Γs log
(
Cst − γsCst−1
)
+ jt log(H
s
t )−
(N st )
1+ψ
1 + ψ
]
(2.1)
where Cst is a standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for consumption, which aggregates the savers’
demand for goods over all i goods in the economy. In order to account for the path of consump-
tion observed in data we introduce habit in consumption, that is captured by the parameter
γs. The parameter Γs ≡ 1 − γs instead ensures that the steady state of the marginal utility of
consumption is 1/Cs. Variable N st denotes hours of labor supplied by savers whereas H
s
t repre-
sents housing services, which enter the utility function scaled by the exogenous process jt. This
can be interpreted as an institutional or exogenous modification of resources that leads agents
to purchase houses with respect to other goods (see Iacoviello and Neri (2010) [37]). Another
source of shock, common in the literature, is the preference shock zt, hitting the whole utility
function. We assume that these shocks follow AR(1) processes:
log(jt) = (1− ρj)j + ρj log(jt−1) + ujt (2.2)
log(zt) = (1− ρz)z + ρz log(zt−1) + uzt (2.3)
where uzt , u
j
t are i.i.d. innovations with variance σ
2
z , σ
2
j .
Savers’ per-period budget constraint is written in the following way:
PtC
s
t + PtIt +B
s
t + PtQt(H
s
t −Hst−1) = W st N st +Bst−1Rt−1 + PtRktKt−1 +
∫ 1
0
Ψtdj (2.4)
where Bst > 0 are one-period assets in nominal terms held at the end of period ”t”, and B
s
t−1
are assets carried over from the previous period, which accrued the gross nominal interest rate
Rt−1. Savers earn labor income, where W st is nominal wage, paid by firms. Therefore, for this
level of wage savers stand ready to supply all the amount of labor that is demanded by firms.
We assume that savers solely own firms, so that Ψt are profits gained by owing firm’s shares
(a continuum of size 1 of firms). Savers accumulate capital from the previous period Kt−1 and
invest resources It in new capital, where R
k
t is the gross return of capital. Each period savers
purchase new housing Hst , so that (H
s
t − Hst−1) is the variation of housing services within the
period. Qt is real housing price in unit of consumption and Pt is the aggregate price level.
Capital evolves over time according to this law of motion:
Kt = at
(
It − φ
2
(
It − It−1
I
)2)
+ (1− δ)Kt−1 (2.5)
where a convex adjustment cost is required to increase capital from one period to another.
Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ. We include an exogenous disturbance at in capital
accumulation that allows capital to increase (or decrease) for a given level of investment. This
technology shock is also assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
log(at) = (1− ρa)a+ ρa log(at−1) + uat (2.6)
where uat ∼ N(0, σ2a).
Hence, savers’ maximization problem consists of maximizing utility (2.1) under the budget
constraint (2.4) and the law of capital accumulation (2.5). This problem is solved by taking
the first-order conditions with respect to the control variables, that are consumption, housing,
labor, investment, capital and assets. These can be combined so as to yield:
u′(Cst ) = βsRtEt
[
u′(Cst+1)
Πt+1
]
(2.7)
Qtu
′(Cst ) = jth
′(Hst ) + βsEt
[
Qt+1u
′(Cst+1)
]
(2.8)
v′(N st )
u′(Cst )
= wst (2.9)
u′(Cst )q
k
t = βsEt
[
u′(Cst+1)((R
k
t+1 + q
k
t+1)
]
(2.10)
atq
k
t u
′(Cst )
(
1− φ∆It
I
)
= u′(Cst )− βsEt
[
u′(Cst+1)at+1q
k
t+1
φ∆It+1
I
]
(2.11)
where u′(Cst ) = Γszt/(Cst − γsCst−1), h′(Hst ) = 1/Hst , v′(N st ) = (N st )ψ, defining the gross infla-
tion rate as Πt ≡ PtPt−1 and real wage wst = W st /Pt.
Equation (2.7) is the standard Euler equation, that characterizes the intertemporal substitution
of consumption. Equation (2.8) is the housing demand equation, whereas (2.9) is the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and labor. Equations (2.10)-(2.11) describe, respec-
tively, the equilibrium conditions for the price of capital and the demand for investment. We
turn now to the borrowers’ problem.
2.2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers maximize the following life-time expected utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtbzt
[
Γb log
(
Cbt − γbCbt−1
)
+ jt log
(
Hbt
)
− (N
b
t )
1+ψ
1 + ψ
]
(2.12)
where Cbt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator defined as in the savers’ problem. As for savers, there
is habit in consumption and Γb ≡ 1− γb implies a steady state value of the borrowers’ marginal
utility of consumption equal to 1/Cb. Further, borrowers’ total utility function is affected by
the same preference shock specified above.
Borrowers’ budget constraint shows:
PtC
b
t +B
b
t−1R
b
t−1 + PtQt(H
b
t −Hbt−1) = W btN bt +Bbt (2.13)
where Bbt > 0 denotes one-period debt (loans), received by the private sector (savers) in period
”t”. Borrowers purchase an amount Hbt of houses each period.
Crucially, borrowers are liquidity constrained. The constraint implies that at any period borrow-
ers can request an amount not greater than a fraction (loan-to-value ratio) of the current-period
value of their real estate value and of a given value (cap on debt-to-income ratio) of their
current-period labor income:
Bbt ≤ γmPtQtHbt + (1− γ)τW btN bt (2.14)
where m is the fraction set as loan-to-value ratio of the collateral and τ is the cap on debt-to-
income ratio (DTI). This constraint implies that the amount of new borrowing in the period is
directly connected to both the standard collateral for mortgages, namely real estate value, and
labor income, representing the only source of income in the model.
This constraint is a novelty and so deserves an explanation. In the literature liquidity constraint
are designed in a way that the amount of borrowing is no greater than either a fraction of real
estate values, as in Iacoviello (2005)[36], or a fraction of current period labor income (Mendoza
(2002)[55]). In this paper we put them together, so that borrowing depends on both. This is
somewhat consistent with reality, as banks and financial companies supply loans taking into
account both the collateral pledged by those requesting the loans (if this is a mortgage) and the
borrower’s current labor income, revealing this a good mirror of the solvency of the applicant.
In this regard, Jappelli (1990) [39] is an empirical study unveiling that the credit supply is
highly connected with borrowers’ personal income. Further, after the financial crisis there is an
increasing trend towards using labor income as necessary criterion in the credit supply decision.
As an example, in US the ”Consumer Financial Protection Bureau” have established that, since
January 2014, borrowers who already have a debt-to-income (DTI) ratio higher than 43% may
not get a ”Qualified Mortgage”, so that large importance is assigned to this measure for judging
whom is really worthy of getting such loan. This ratio is computed taking into account debt
in a broad sense, composed by all the monthly recurring payments, for principal and interest
of mortgages, property taxes, credit cart payments, car loan payments, student loan payments
and other minor payments8.
The borrowing constraint (2.14) can also be interpreted in terms of all loans being split between
mortgages, which are typically supplied requesting housing as collateral, and unsecured loans,
for which main guarantee for the lender is borrowers’ labor income. Equivalently, one may think
of all borrowers being divided in those pledging real estate as collateral and those that instead
back the supplied loan with labor income.
A particular role is played by the parameter 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, which regulates the breakdown of how
much of borrowing is tied to real estate and to labor income. We will see that the effectiveness
of the macroprudential cap on DTI strongly hinges on this parameter.
Therefore, borrowers maximize utility (2.12) under the budget constraint (2.13) and the collat-
eral liquidity constraint (2.14). First-order conditions yield:
u′(Cbt )(1− ωt) = βbEt
[
u′(Cbt+1)Rt
Πt+1
]
(2.15)
Qtu
′(Cbt ) (1− γmωt) = jth′(Hbt ) + βbEt
[
Qt+1u
′(Cbt+1)
]
(2.16)
v′(N bt )
u′(Cbt )
= wbt (1 + (1− γ)τωt) (2.17)
where u′(Cbt ) = Γbzt/(Cbt − γbCbt−1), h′(Hbt ) = 1/Hbt , v′(N bt ) = (N bt )ψ and defining real wage as
wbt = W
b
t /Pt.
Since now the maximization problem encompasses a borrowing constraint, there is also a com-
plementary slackness condition, which is given by:
ωt ≥ 0 ωt
[
γmPtQtH
b
t + (1− γ)τW btN bt −Bbt
]
= 0
where the variable ωt represents the ”shadow” price of borrowing, that is the marginal cost of
making the constraint binding or equivalently the marginal revenue of relaxing it.
8According to the Consumer Financial Bureau, the debt-to-income ratio is ”one way lenders measure your
ability to manage the payments you make every month to repay the money you have borrowed.” (from Consumer
Financial Bureau website.)
The shadow price of borrowing enters borrowers’ Euler equation, given by equation (2.15), and
creates a ”wedge” that can impede borrowers to smooth consumption over time. Besides, shadow
price affects also the relation between real wage and marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor. Regarding this, a sensible implication arises: the disutility of working
one more hour at the margin gives rise to one more benefit, which sums to the wage earned by
working more; this additional benefit is the opportunity to borrow more and so further increase
their consumption.
Throughout the paper the borrowing constraint is treated as always binding, so that the shadow
price of borrowing is always a positive equilibrium variable. This is reasonable to the extent to
which we focus on the credit boom, so that it is likely that during this phase borrowers are, in
fact, liquidity constrained.
2.2.3 Firms
The production side of the economy features perfectly competitive firms producing final goods
and monopolistically competitive firms producing intermediate goods. Specifically, there exists
a continuum of size 1 of perfectly competitive final good firms, in which each of them purchases
an intermediate differentiated good in order to produce a final good, using the CES technology:
Yt ≡
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
t
t−1di
] t−1
t
where Yt is the final good produced and Yt(i) is the intermediate good used as an input (i
denotes the variety of the good). t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution among different
varieties of goods demanded and is supposed to be greater than one: t > 1. We allow for
exogenous shifts of this elasticity, according to an AR(1) equation:
log(t) = (1− ρ)+ ρ log(t−1) + ut (2.18)
with ut ∼ N(0, σ2 ). This represents the mark-up shock of our economy.
Final goods firms compete in a perfectly competitive market, so that they maximize profits by
taking as given the aggregate price level and the price of any intermediate good. Hence, their
profit maximization problem yields the equation demand of Yt(i):
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−t
Yt (2.19)
where Pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i and Pt is the aggregate price level. As to
the latter, one can prove that by imposing the zero profit condition (since the market of final
goods is perfectly competitive) the aggregate price level Pt is given by the following aggregator:
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0 Pt(i)
1−tdi
] 1
1−t .
Turning to intermediate goods, each good is produced by a firm competing with other firm in a
monopolistic fashion. The firm producing the good i is endowed with the production function:
Yt(i) = (Kt(i))
α
(
(N st (i))
χ
(
N bt (i)
)1−χ)1−α
(2.20)
where χ represents the labor income share of unconstrained agents (or their contribution to
production). Therefore, due to this assumption on labor, cost minimization problem delivers:
MCt =
wstN
s
t (i)
(1− α)χYt(i) (2.21)
MCt =
wbtN
b
t (i)
(1− α)(1− χ)Yt(i) (2.22)
where MCt is the real marginal cost. Cost minimization with respect to capital yields:
MCt =
RktKt−1(i)
αYt(i)
. (2.23)
Intermediate good firms set price as in Calvo’s model, that is a only a generic fraction 1 − θ
of firms with 0 < θ ≤ 1 can change its price at any future period T , whereas the remaining
fraction θ of firms do not change the price and so anchor this to the inflation target Π¯. Profit
maximization problem of intermediate good firm allows to choose the optimal price level:
max
P ?t
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
(βsθ)
T−tλT
[
Π¯T−tPt(i)
YT (i)
PT
−MCTYT (i)
]}
where λt ≡ Γs/(Cst − γsCst−1) is the savers’ marginal utility of consumption, at which future
profits are discounted9. Firms maximize this profit function subject to the demand equation,
given by (2.19). First order condition of the above problem delivers:
P ∗t
Pt
=
t
t − 1
Et
{∑∞
T=t(θβs)
T−tλT
(
PT
Pt
1
Π¯T−t
)t
MCTYT
}
Et
{∑∞
T=t(θβs)
T−tλt
(
PT
Pt
1
Π¯T−t
)t−1
YT
} (2.24)
where in equilibrium Pt(i) = P
∗
t , since all firms set their price equal to the optimal one. Due to
Calvo assumption, the aggregate price level follows the law of motion:
P 1−tt = (1− θ)P ∗1−tt + θP 1−tt−1 Π¯1−t . (2.25)
9Recall that firms are only owned by savers.
Furthermore, in order to aggregate across all firms it is possible to define the index of price
dispersion ∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−t
di. From equation (2.25), one can prove that price dispersion
follows the law of motion:
∆t ≡ θ
(
Πt
Π¯
)t
∆t−1 + (1− θ)
(
1− θ (Πt
Π¯
)t−1
1− θ
) t
t−1
.
2.2.4 Central bank
The monetary authority is responsible of setting the nominal interest rate. We assume that this
is set according to the Taylor-like monetary rule:
Rt = R
rr
t−1R
(1−rr)
(
Πt
Π¯
)(1−rr)rpi (Yt
Y
)(1−rr)ry
ζt (2.26)
where variable without index are at their respective steady state. rr is the parameter governing
the persistence of the response of central bank to the previous period interest rate and ry, rpi are
parameters that govern the central bank’s reaction to, respectively, output and inflation. We
allow for a monetary policy shock ζt, designed as
log(ζt) = ρζ log(ζt−1) + u
ζ
t (2.27)
with uζt ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ).
2.2.5 Aggregation and market clearing
To close the model we impose market clearing conditions. Resource constraint (in real terms)
of our economy reads:
Yt = C
s
t + C
b
t + It. (2.28)
Aggregate labor for savers and borrowers are:
N st =
∫ 1
0
N st (i)di (2.29)
N bt =
∫ 1
0
N bt (i)di. (2.30)
Aggregating capital units yields:
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kt(i)di. (2.31)
Then, market clearing condition of financial markets must hold, so that loans supplied to bor-
rowers must be tantamount to the level of assets held by savers:
Bst −Bbt = 0. (2.32)
Finally, we assume that housing supply is in fixed amount and equal to H¯, so that housing
market clearing condition is written as
Hst +H
b
t = H¯. (2.33)
The complete set of equilibrium conditions is reported in Appendix.
2.3 Estimation
We estimate the baseline model with standard Bayesian techniques. The model is linearised
around the deterministic steady state so that a state space representation of the model is de-
rived. This representation enables to acquire the likelihood function through a standard Kalman
filter. Then, we obtain the moments of the posterior distribution of the parameters object of
estimation through the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, by drawing from the posteriors a large
enough number of times. Convergence of the algorithm is properly verified through standard
Geweke’s diagnostics test10.
A detail of data used for estimation is reported in Appendix. We consider five observable vari-
ables: consumption, investment, interest rate, inflation and house prices11. As in Iacoviello and
Guerrieri (2016) [34] we do not include household debt as an observable. The reason is that the
map between this variable in the model and its correspondent on data is not perfect, because in
the model debt can only be assumed by constrained agents, thus precluding the fact that asset
holders may also borrow. Notwithstanding, we then show that the simulation of the estimated
model draws a path of household debt that mirrors the one actually experienced. In order to
remove the trend from raw data we apply the one-sided HP filter with smoothing parameters
set to 100,00012.
Series of data consist in quarterly observations ranging from 1991:3 - 2005:4. The reason for
choosing this range is that we focus on the credit boom that has led to the financial crisis. As
pointed out by Justiniano et al. (2015)[41], it would be unfeasible to replicate a credit boom
10We use the software platform Dynare 4.4.3 to perform the model estimation.
11Recall that the model features five structural shocks.
12For a discussion about using this method to remove the long-term component see Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2016)[34].
starting from a point in time in 2000’s, as it would require a too large deviation from the steady
state. Thus, we can think of the steady state of the model being the period after the Great
Moderation, namely the beginning of 90’s, so that variations of leveraging from these values can
be understood in terms of likely deviations from the steady state.
INSERT TABLE 2.1
We first calibrate some parameters, that are reported in Table 2.1. Specifically, savers’ discount
factor βs = 0.9975 implies an annual interest rate equal to 3% in steady state. We set the loan-
to-value ratio to 85% as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010)[37]. Values of other coefficients α, δ,  are
quite standard in the literature. Note that setting  = 6 implies that the frictionless markup is
equal to 1.2. We assume an inverse Frisch elasticity of labor equal to ψ = 1 and that agents are
equally shared in production, so that χ = 0.5. Finally, Π¯ = 1.005 implies a 2% annual inflation
target rate. Importantly, this calibration implies that consumption accounts for 75% of GDP
(C/Y=0.75) whereas the investment share is the remaining 25% (I/Y=0.25). We calibrate the
weight of housing in utility function and the supply of houses so as to obtain a ratio between
housing wealth and GDP as close as possible to Iacoviello and Neri (2010) 13.
INSERT TABLE 2.2
Regarding the priors used for our Bayesian estimation, they can be seen in Table 2.2. Overall,
they are consistent with previous studies. The novelty is the prior chosen for parameters γ and
τ , namely the share of collateral in the borrowing constraint and the cap on debt-to-income
ratio. For both we consider a prior mean equal to 0.50. Notice that a debt-to-income to ratio
of 50% is quite large and is consistent with the lax constraint on borrowing observed prior to
the crisis. Indeed, according to Fed’s Office of the Controller of the Currency before the crisis,
a ”subprime” loan was characterized by a loan with counterpart having a debt-to-income ratio
larger than 50%14. Furthermore, Jacome and Mitra (2015) [38] study the implementation of the
macroprudential cap on debt-to-income ratio in six countries (Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, Korea,
Malaysia, Poland and Romania), reporting evidence that the range along which the cap on DTI
has been moved when facing standard borrowers is between 30% and 65%. In Mendoza [55] τ is
calibrated so that borrowers can borrow up to 40% of their labor income, however he does not
focus on the credit boom phase.
13In their model this ratio is set to 1.36. In ours, this is slightly above (1.53).
14See the ”Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs”, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
INSERT TABLE 2.3
Table 2.3 reports the estimates. Specifically, habit in consumption is larger for savers (0.86) than
for borrowers (0.34). The estimated cost of installing capital (11.05) is far more sizeable than
prior mean. Furthermore, parameters of Taylor rule are equal to 0.51 for the interest rate iner-
tia and to 2.11 and 0.11 for the central bank’s responses to, respectively, inflation and output.
As for structural shocks, one can notice a very large persistence for housing preference shocks
(0.99). Remarkably, the cap on debt-to-income ratio is around 0.51, implying that agents have
borrowed up to a fraction of 51% of their labor income. As discussed above, this is quite large
and thus becomes consistent with the credit boom observed in the years 2000-2006. Crucially,
estimates show that borrowing is almost entirely collateralized with real estate value: in fact,
estimate of γ reads 0.98, so that borrowers’ labor income only marginally affects the supply of
new loans.
2.3.1 Model fit, variance decomposition and identifiability
The model described in the previous section appears to line up data pretty well. To observe this
we match the moments obtained simulating the model with those computed on data. Specifi-
cally, we set parameters to their posterior mean, apart from those calibrated, and then simulate
100000 artificial time series from the model. In table 2.4 we report standard deviation and
autocorrelation of the observables in comparison with those obtained by feeding the model with
artificial data. It clearly turns out that moments of simulated time series are quite close to those
computed on data.
INSERT TABLE 2.4
Further, we inspect the role of the model structural shocks in accounting for the observable
variables. Figure 2.2 displays the historical variance decomposition for two key variables: con-
sumption and house price. Importantly, as shown also in Iacoviello and Neri [37], housing
preference shock almost entirely explains the path of house prices, whereas little is due to the
role of monetary policy shock. Therefore, we can claim that the huge increase in house prices,
which in turn fuelled the credit boom, has been originated in the housing market, thorough a
sudden increase in the demand for housing.
Finally, we want to verify the quality of the estimation, investigating whether parameters are
correctly identified. To do this, we perform the same exercise as in Schmitt-Groh and Uribe
(2012) [66]. We first calibrate the model with the posterior mean of all parameters and simulate
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Figure 2.2: Historical variance decomposition of aggregate consumption and house prices.
Variables are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady state.
artificial time series with length equal to the data set (58 observations). Then, we estimate
again the model with the same specification prior, considering the artificial series for consump-
tion, investment, house prices, inflation and interest rate as new observable variables, without
exploiting the knowledge about the true parameters.
Objective of this exercise is to check whether the repeated estimation delivers the true underly-
ing parameters, that is those estimated through real data.
INSERT TABLE 2.5
Overall, in Table 2.5 it can be seen that the new estimates are quite close to the true parameters.
This is particularly remarkable for the two key parameters of our analysis, γ and τ , which report
value that are surprisingly close to the true value (γ = 0.95, τ= 0.50).
2.4 The impact of the macroprudential cap on debt-
to-income (DTI) ratio
2.4.1 Cap on debt-to-income ratio as a macroprudential policy
Macroprudential policies are implemented with the specific role of safeguarding financial stabil-
ity, maintaining an adequate level of household debt in the financial system 15. This implies
that macroprudential authority should be assigned specific policy instruments to accomplish this
task.
As discussed in the Introduction, we assume that a macroprudential policy is featured by two
policy instruments. They are the cap on debt-to-income ratio τ and the breakdown of the bor-
rowing constraint between collateral and labor income, captured by the parameter γ. We now
explain the reason for which these parameters are macroprudential instruments.
We begin with the cap on debt-to-income ratio. In the literature it is recommended that macro-
prudential policies should follow specific rules, so that policy instruments react to all contin-
gencies in a predetermined way, that is following a rule. Further, they should be set in a
countercyclical way so as to smooth credit cycles and to avert ”over-heating” of macro vari-
ables, like private debt. Therefore, we assume that macroprudential authority sets the cap on
debt-to-income ratio according to a countercyclical rule written in this way:
τt = τ
(
bbt
bb
)−τb
(2.34)
where τ is the estimated value of the cap on debt-to-income ratio, bbt is household debt (in real
terms), where bb is its steady state16. Thus, the cap on DTI is no longer a fixed parameter, but
becomes a policy variable, which reacts to a given contingency of the economy. The underlying
assumption is that the macroprudential authority is empowered to specify this policy variable
to achieve financial stability. To this end, τb ≥ 0 is the parameter which rules the action of the
authority, so that larger values of this parameter imply that the authority is responding to a
larger extent. The sign of this parameter is non-negative to ensure that the instrument reacts
in a countercyclical fashion to the deviation of household debt, so that an increase of the latter
15According to Bank of England (2009) [60] a macroprudential policy should react against the financial cycles
in order ”to avoid the type of boom and bust cycles in the supply of credit and liquidity that has marked the
recent financial crisis”. The use of instruments ”effective in leaning against both the upswing and the downswing
in the financial cycle” has been recommended also by the Basel Committee on the Global Financial System (2010)
[62].
16We have also studied the case of a macroprudential policy responding to movements in house prices, rather
than household debt. Main results of the paper do not differ. Results for the case of house prices are available
upon request.
above the steady state would activate a reduction of the cap on debt-to-income ratio.
This first instrument of macroprudential policy, entailing a change in the polucy instrument
(cap on debt-to-income ratio in our case) around the deterministic steady state is standard the
literature. We now turn to the other macroprudential instrument, the parameter γ. Impor-
tantly, this parameter affects the steady state, thus implying that changing γ produces also a
steady-state effect on welfare.
The reason for considering γ as a macroprudential instrument is the following. A remarkable
result of our estimation is the fact that the impact of borrowers’ labor income in the credit
supply decision is quite poor, as borrowing is almost completely (98%) collateralized to real
estate value. This implies that the amount of debt outstanding has been strongly affected by
swings in real estate values. As a matter of fact, owing to the detrimental legacies caused by
the burst of the bubble in the real estate sector, a fact that broke the credit boom phase and
therefore ignited the financial crisis, authorities have called into question the strong linkage be-
tween real estate values and credit supply. Therefore, we can conjecture that a macroprudential
authority may well want to lower the incidence of the collateral so as to dampen the financial
amplification mechanism. By this virtue we assume that the macroprudential authority may set
the parameter γ, which regulates the weight of the collateral (or , equivalently, the one of labor
income) in credit supply decision.
Hence, a ”macroprudential policy” can make use of both the parameter γ and a countercyclical
rule described by equation (2.34). We stress the fact that the macroprudential authority is en-
dowed with two instruments to pursue a specific macroprudential policy is of practical relevance,
as distinguishes our paper from other dealing with the optimal conduct of macroprudential poli-
cies.
2.4.2 The welfare effect of the macroprudential cap on DTI
Main argument to support the effectiveness of a particular macroprudential policy is the effect
that this policy produces in terms of welfare. To this end, we build a social welfare measure
obtained by aggregating welfare measures of savers and borrowers. We numerically solve the
model with standard perturbation method and then report all welfare measures, i.e. those for
both agents and also social welfare. Welfare is calculated from the second-order approximation
of welfare measure (defined below) and model equilibrium conditions 17.
We define the agent-specific unconditional welfare as the expected discounted sum of utility from
17It is well known in the literature that standard perturbation methods with first-order approximation of
equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state of the model is not an accurate way to evaluate
different policies in terms of welfare. Schmitt-Groh and Uribe (2004) [67] argue that in order to properly perform
a second order approximation to the welfare objective function a second order approximation to the policy function
is required. See also Kim and Kim (2003) [44] .
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where V s and V b denote, respectively, savers’ welfare and borrowers’ welfare.
These agent-specific welfare measure are aggregated so as to obtain a social-welfare function,
which is written as:
V ≡ µV s + (1− µ)V b. (2.35)
where µ is the weight assigned to savers and therefore (1−µ) is the borrowers’ one. We assume
that the policymaker assign an equal weight to agents’ welfare: µ = 0.5. Later in the papers we
consider also the case of different weights.
In the welfare analysis that follows we will evaluate welfare under different policies. To facilitate
the comparison across them, we compute the consumption equivalent, which is the fraction of
consumption that an agent should obtain with respect to the estimated model in order to be
compensated for the implementation of a given policy. Thus, a positive value of this measure
represents a gain whereas a negative one is a welfare loss.
As a first step, we compare welfare between the estimated model, that is when macroprudential
policy is completely absent (and the cap on DTI remains at its estimated value (τ = 0.51))
and the case in which macroprudential policy is active and optimized. In this latter case the
macroprudential authority is concerned about finding the optimal response, captured by τb. We
search for this optimal parameter, under the constraints imposed by the equilibrium conditions
of the model. To do this, we apply the grid search method, building a grid of plausible values for
the parameters γ and τb in order to find the ”optimal” ones, that is the combination of the two
that yields the maximum value of social welfare. This maximization problem can be written as:
max
γ?∈[0,1];τ?b ∈[τb,τ¯b]
V (2.36)
where V is social welfare, which is defined below, and τb and τ¯b are, respectively, the lower and
the upper bound of the grid of plausible values for the parameter in the rule for the cap on
DTI. The grid of γ is clearly [0, 1], whereas for τb it is set as [0, 3], allowing the case of a large
response to household debt. We will see that a reaction of the size τb = 3 implies that, under
the sequence of estimated shocks, the cap on debt-to-income is lowered by a maximum of 30%
in the period considered.
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Figure 2.3: Social welfare, savers’ and borrowers’ welfare, unconditional mean of household
debt-to-GDP ratio for γ ∈ [0, 1].
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Results are displayed in Table 2.6. Firstly, it clearly emerges that the macroprudential policy is
Pareto-improving, as it delivers social welfare equal to -124.7534 with respect to -124.8217 as in
the estimated model. Secondly, it is evident that there is a considerable gain from adopting two
instruments of macroprudential policy (see third and fourth row in Table 2.6). Thirdly, the op-
timal macroprudential policy involves a reduction of the parameter γ from the estimated model
(γ? = 0.79) and the highest possible response of the cap on debt-to-income ratio around the
steady state (τ?b = 3). Therefore, the simulation unambiguously reveals that the macropruden-
tial cap on DTI produces a Pareto-improvement to the extent to which the cap on debt-to-income
responds strongly to deviation of household debt and the weight of labor income in the borrow-
ing constraint is large enough (that is, when γ is progressively smaller).
This latter result can be further observed in the left panel of Figure 2.3, where we display social
welfare for all values of γ. It is apparent that social welfare is maximized in correspondence of
γ = 0.78. Moreover, the same figure reveals that for this level of γ the economy experiences a
large contraction in the ratio between household debt and GDP (the dashed red line represents
its unconditional mean). Thus, it turns out that lowering the parameter γ from its estimated
value leads to higher social welfare and more financial stability.
It is also interesting to note that the optimal macroprudential policy provides a strong sta-
bilization effect of financial variables. In this regard, in Table 2.6 we also report percentage
standard deviation of the main variables. It can be seen that that implementing an optimal
macroprudential DTI leads to considerably lower standard deviation for household debt and
house prices, along with a modest decline in variability of output and inflation.
Finally, we turn to the welfare changes specific to the agents. It turns out that, as in other papers
dealing with macroprudential policies, (for instance, see Angelini et al. (2012)[1], Lambertini et
al. (2013)[49], Carrasco-Galego and Rubio (2014)[14]) it appears a ”trade-off” between savers
and borrowers. However, in our framework there is a ”reversal” of the trade-off documented in
this literature: savers benefit from the implementation of the macroprudenial policy, whereas
borrowers lose. We investigate better this tendency in the next subsection.
Summarizing, an optimal macroprudential DTI is welfare-enhancing with respect to the esti-
mated model. The efficiency of the macroprudential policy stems from reducing the incidence
of the collateral in credit supply decision (thus enlarging the role for labor income) and letting
the cap on debt-to-income to respond to household debt in a countercylical fashion.
2.4.3 The credit boom and a counterfactual scenario
The effect of a macroprudential policy can be markedly observed in relation to the pre-crisis
scenario, characterized by excessive level of leveraging. In this regard, the model presented
above can be used to replicate this scenario, tracking the most relevant macroeconomic aggregate
variables. Then, it is compelling to illustrate a different scenario, which, as we will see, features
instead a more sustainable growth of household debt. This latter is the scenario where an
optimal macroprudential debt-to-income ratio is adopted in the economy.
In order to replicate first the path of over-borrowing, we implement the following exercise. We
simulate the estimated model, feeding the model with the series of smoothed shocks obtained
from the Bayesian estimation. Model parameters are therefore set at the posterior mean.
The circled red line in Figure 2.4 draws the path response of consumption, output, aggregate
labor income, house prices and household debt. Obviously, consumption and house prices report
same path observed in data. Since house prices started growing significantly at the beginning
of 1996, to emphasise the rise of household debt we report the variables as a difference with the
respect to the value observed at the end of the year 1995. In this way, variables draw a path
similar to a trend, although this has been removed with the HP filter. Therefore, we can see that
from 1996 through the end of 2005 house prices increased by almost 100%, whereas consumption
reported only a small increase (around 5%). Importantly, the simulation shows that household
debt soared by almost 100% as well, which is overall consistent with the build-up of leveraging
observed in data (see Figure 2.1)18 By contrast, with the solid blue line we display the case of
an optimal macroprudential policy, which is attained by setting γ? = 0.79 and τ?b = 3 in the
rule (2.34). Most noticeably, when macroprudential policy is active household debt increases
moderately, in spite of the same increase in house prices. This mainly occurs because the
18Recall that we do not include household debt as an observable variable.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated model vs. model with macroprudential policy. Responses of
the main model variables, under the sequence of estimated shocks. Variables are computed as
difference with respect to the level in 1995:4.
appreciation of the collateral now impacts less strongly on borrowing decision. Notice also the
in our counterfactual simulation the cap on DTI is lowered until it reaches -30% by the end of
2005.
Importantly, the milder increase in household debt has no cost in terms of consumption and
output, which instead show a larger increase over the years approaching the end of the sample.
Figure 2.4 provides an intuition for why macroprudential policy leads to a reduction in borrowers’
welfare. It is immediately apparent that borrowers experience a smaller increase in consumption
and housing and a more sizeable rise in hours worked. Importantly, this general equilibrium
effect can be largely explained by the behaviour of the ”shadow price” of borrowing (right-down
panel). In fact, in the estimated model (γ = 0.98) this variable goes down, pointing towards
a relaxation of the borrowing constraint. This effect is a consequence of the appreciation of
real estate values, that makes the borrowing constraint less binding and therefore borrowers are
induced to assume more debt.
Conversely, when the macroprudential policy is in place, the marginal cost of a binding constraint
rises, so that borrowers borrow less, consume less and are instead led to supply more work.
Thus, the increase of the shadow price of borrowing, which amplifies the effect of the borrowers’
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor, generates a mechanism such that
borrowers are forced to ”sacrifice” a portion of consumption and to supply more work. This
effect can be seen by equilibrium condition (2.17), which is the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor. Clearly, an increase in ωt, the ”shadow” price of borrowing,
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implies that the wedge between consumption and labor broadens, so that for a given level of
consumption and wage borrowers are induced to work more, or for a given level of labor and wage
borrowers consume less. Notice that this effect amplifies the lower is γ, that is the larger is the
weight of labor income in credit supply decision. Therefore, it seems that the macroprudential
policy, by lowering γ, acts through an amplification of the impact of the wedge in the MRS of
borrowers. Crucially, this action, which is found to be Pareto-improving, leads to an increase
in a wedge in the economy and a simultaneous stabilization of household debt. Thus, it arises
a particular ”trade-off”, according to which a social-welfare maximizing policymaker tends to
increase a wedge in the economy with the purpose of fulfilling financial stabilty.
The stabilization effect of the macroprudential policy can be also observed in the left-down
panel of Figure 2.5, where we report the simulated real estate-to-labor income ratio, computed
as: QtH
b
t /w
b
tN
b
t . Apparently, in the estimated model this ratio increase dramatically, more than
doubling. When the model features the optimal macroprudential policy things are substantially
different, as the ratio remains closer to zero level. Thus, although house prices worryingly soar,
the action of the optimal macroprudential policy leads to a stabilization of the ratio between
borrowers’ real estate values and labor income. This is a fascinating consequence of the reduction
in house purchases and the simultaneous increase in hours supplied.
2.5 The role of monetary policy during a credit boom
Particular attention is devoted in the literature to the role of monetary policy in case of a credit
boom. In fact, the US monetary policy stance over the years of the credit boom prior to the
crisis has been largely questioned19. In particular, the strategy advocated by former Fed’ chief
Alan Greenspan and labelled ”mopping up after the crash”, consisting in leaving the credit boom
ending on its own, without undertaking any monetary policy action (”post hoc interventionism”)
has been criticized and blamed to be too lax20.
Consequently, since the aftermath of the crisis there has been a wide debate concerning how
monetary policy should be conducted when the credit boom poses a plausible threat. Two
opposite views have been facing each other. The first view suggests that central bank should
adopt a ”reactive” stance, so that it should raise interest rate in the case of a credit boom. This
strategy of - how is called - ”leaning against the wind” of a credit boom, is coherent with the view
that central bank is able to pursue both the goals of inflation targeting and financial stability21.
The alternative view reckons that central bank should only pursue its primary objective of
inflation targeting, leaving the goal of financial stability to the macroprudential authority (”two
instruments for two goals”, according to the famous Tinbergen principle)22. To this end, the
macroprudential authority should be in charge of adopting ex-ante measures (”macroprudential”
measures) with the precise intention of preventing the credit boom.
As we will see in the sequel, our framework allows to provide a comparison in terms of welfare
between these opposing cases and, ultimately, a combination of the two.
2.5.1 Optimal Taylor rule and ”leaning against the wind”
In the previous section, we showed that the macroprudential policy of our interest is welfare-
enhancing. The welfare analysis has been run holding the parameters governing the monetary
policy rule fixed at the estimated value. Thus, we studied the optimal macroprudential policy
for a given monetary policy rule. In this section we examine the optimal conduct of monetary
policy, when this is enforced as a standard Taylor rule. This allows us to infer how the presence
19Most important criticism lifted in the aftermath of the crisis is that policy rate has been ”too low for too
long” (Taylor (2009)[75]) .
20This strategy, that was dominant before the crisis, was based on the presumption that the monetary institution
would stick to its main goal of inflation targeting, even during a credit boom. On this point, see Blinder and Reis
(2005)[11].
21See, among the others, Woodford (2012) [81].
22Svensson (2012) [74] argues that central bank and macroprudential authority should have distinct objectives,
with the monetary authority focusing exclusively on its goal of inflation stabilization and leaving macroprudential
instruments to address financial instability. Svensson (2017)[73] shows that the benefits of ”leaning against the
wind” fall short of the costs.
of macroprudential policy affects the welfare impact of a standard Taylor rule.
To do this, we first explore only the optimal conduct of monetary policy, i.e. absent any macro-
prudential policy. Specifically, we assume that central bank maintains same inertia as observed
in data (rr = 0.51) and we search for the optimal (social welfare-maximizing) parameters of the
Taylor rule (ry, rpi) in the estimated model, solving the following problem:
max
r?y ,r
?
pi
V (2.37)
where V is social welfare as defined above. Regarding the parameters of the Taylor rule, we
consider a value within the grid [1.01; 6] for rpi, and [0; 3] for ry. Notice that the grid for the
parameter that governs the reaction of central bank to inflation (rpi) starts from a value larger
than 1 to ensure determinacy of equilibrium.
Secondly, we allow central bank to respond also to variation in financial variables. In fact,
the burst of the crisis has led many economists to think of the need for central banks to take
into account also financial variables alongside inflation and output in their decisions concerning
interest rate movements. This is a proposal in line with the view supporting that central
bank could also be in charge of financial stability. According to this strategy, when an excess
of borrowing threatens the economy, central bank should ”lean against the wind” of a credit
boom, by raising the interest rate in order to discourage borrowers and thus preserve financial
stability23.
In order to configure this latter strategy, we consider an alternative characterization of the Taylor
rule:
Rt = R
rr
t−1R
(1−rr)
(
Πt
Π¯
)(1−rr)rpi (Yt
Y
)(1−rr)ry (bbt
bb
)(1−rr)rb
ζt, (2.38)
i.e. the standard Taylor rule is augmented with a reaction to deviation of household debt from
the steady state, with rb ≥ 024. Accordingly, now the problem becomes:
max
ry ,rpi ,rb
V
so that there is a further parameter rb in social-welfare maximization. For the parameters of the
augmented Taylor rule, we consider a value within the grid [0, 3] for rb, whereas for the other
parameters ry, rpi grids are set as in the previous section.
23Smets (2013) [70] provides an exhaustive survey of the literature dealing with the policy of ”leaning against
the wind”.
24This specification of ”debt-adjusted” Taylor rule can be found, among the others, in Curdia and Woodford
(2010)[17], Lambertini et al. (2013)[49]
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Table 2.7 reports the welfare measures obtained in the two cases described above, that is in case
of the ”optimized Taylor rule (TR)” and when instead we consider a debt-adjusted Taylor rule
so as to pursue the ”leaning against the wind” (LAW) strategy. It can be noted that augmenting
the Taylor rule with a reaction to household debt (r?b = 0.42) delivers an improvement in social
welfare with respect to the optimized standard Taylor rule.
Table 7 also reveals that the ”leaning against the wind” policy brings about a larger stabiliza-
tion of debt. However, lower standard deviation of household debt is accompanied with larger
deviation of output and inflation, implying that greater financial stability comes at the cost of
bearing more variability of output and inflation25. Thus, we find that implementing ”leaning
against the wind” policy generates a ”trade-off” between stabilization of financial variables and
stabilization of output and inflation.
2.5.2 Macroprudential DTI and optimized Taylor rules
We now investigate how the optimal response of the central bank changes once this acts in coor-
dination with a macroprudential authority that can also attain an optimal policy. Therefore, it
becomes a problem of joint optimization, so that both authorities are assumed to be optimizing
at the same time:
max
γ,τb,ry ,rpi
V (2.39)
where parameters (ry, rpi) are choice of the monetary authority, and parameters (γ, τb) is the
choice of the macroprudential authority. This joint policy problem reflects the strategy of ”two
instruments for two goals”, because central bank is engaged in the maximizing the parameters
related to price stability and the macroprudential authority is instead concerned about finding
the optimal response to variations that undermine financial stability.
We can derive two results from this exercise. First, an optimized Taylor rule performs better
when accompanied with an optimal macroprudential policy. Second, by comparing the strategy
of ”leaning against the wind”, previously characterized, with the strategy of ”two instruments
for two goals” we note that the latter is unambiguously welfare-dominating, as it delivers higher
social welfare (-124.7088) than the strategy of ”leaning against the wind” (-124.7185). Concern-
ing the stabilization effect of these two policies, we can see that the strategy of ”leaning against
the wind” produces a stronger stabilization of household debt (11.70), which, nevertheless, is
25Woodford (2012) [81] argues that allowing more variability in output and inflation in order to purse financial
stability may be desirable.
not considerably superior than in case of optimal macroprudential policy (12.18). However, the
former policy leads to a noticeably larger variability of inflation and output, thus implying a
”trade-off” between stabilization of financial variables and standard macroeconomic variables.
Finally, our framework allows to study the case of a combination between the ”leaning against
the wind” policy and the policy of ”two instruments for two goals”. Therefore, we impose that
the coordinated maximization problem now becomes:
max
γ,τb,ry ,rpi ,rb
V (2.40)
so that both central bank (ry, rpi, rb) and macroprudential authority (γ, τb) may target financial
stability.
Crucially, this exercise reveals that this combined policy is the best-performing, as it delivers the
highest value of social welfare under all simulations. Furthermore, this policy seems to attain
the best stabilization of household debt, albeit the stabilization of output and inflation worsens
with respect to the estimated model26. Importantly, this result suggests that the best policy
tends to favour the stabilization of household debt, or, in other words, that a departure from the
standard goal of price stability is desirable when the economy is undergoing a credit boom27.
Summarizing, we have found that the macroprudential cap on debt-to-income is an efficient
complement of monetary policy. Importantly, a strategy of ”two instruments for two goals” -
financial stability assigned to a well-designed macroprudential policy and inflation targeting to
central bank - is a more efficient strategy than the case in which the objective of financial stability
is undertaken by central bank which ”leans against the wind”. However, the best performing
policy, both in terms of social welfare and stabilization of private debt is a combination of the
”leaning against the wind” policy and macroprudential policy.
2.6 Other issues
2.6.1 A comparison with a macroprudential loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio
Most of the works analysing the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy focus
on the implementation of a macroprudential policy for the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, rather than
26The fact that the best-performing policy leads to the best stabilization of household debt can be also found in
Angelini et al. (2012)[1], Lambertini et al. (2013)[49]. Likewise, in these works the improvement in stabilization
of private debt comes at the cost of bearing more variability in output and inflation.
27See discussion in Woodford (2012)[81].
the cap on debt-to-income ratio28. This way the macroprudential authority may target more
directly the real estate sector, where the over-valuation of real estate values takes place. By this
virtue, an increase in household debt is tackled with a reduction of the loan-to-value ratio.
Our framework allows to compare the performance of the LTV policy with the policy on the cap
on DTI and, ultimately, to combine the two so as to design a joint macroprudential policy. To
this end, we introduce in the our model a countercyclical rule for the LTV which is specular to
the one adopted for the cap on DTI:
mt = m
(
bbt
bb
)−mb
(2.41)
with mb ≥ 0. We therefore optimize the parameter mb over the range [0, 3].
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Results displayed in Table 2.8 clearly uncover that a LTV policy grants a welfare-gain with
respect to the estimated model. Interestingly enough, with the LTV policy the stabilization of
household debt is greatly attained. However, the macroprudential cap on DTI seems to perform
unambiguously better than the LTV policy. Thus, we find the the macroprudential DTI is a
more efficient policy than the standard LTV policy.
Finally, we explore the case when these two macroprudential policies are jointly used to achieve
a better performance in terms of financial stability. It turns out that a combined use of the two
policies improves on the performance of the LTV although, surprisingly enough, macroprudential
DTI alone represents the best policy outcome.
2.6.2 Coordination vs. Non Coordination
In the previous section we found the optimal combination of the social-welfare maximizing pa-
rameters of the monetary policy rule and the macroprudential policy. In this regard, we assumed
that the two authorities were maximizing jointly, under perfect coordination. Nonetheless, no-
body would guarantee that perfect coordination allows to obtain the best policy outcome. In
fact, in the literature there is no unanimous consensus on whether the two policies should be
adopted in coordinated or non-coordinated way. As an example, Bean et al. (2010) [3] and
Angelini et al. (2012)[1] argue for a coordination between the two policies, whereas Svensson
28 The rule for the loan-to-value ratio as a macroprudential policy has been extensively studied in the literature
(see, among the others, Lambertini et al. (2013)[49], Carrasco-Galego and Rubio (2014)[14]). Furthermore,
empirical studies show that this instrument has been widely used in the aftermath of the crisis, also in combination
with a macroprudential cap on DTI. An active countercyclical policy for the loan-to-value (LTV) has been first
applied in Asia since the housing boom of mid-2000s. Refer to Lim et al (2011)[50] for a comprehensive focus on
the application of the countercyclical LTV rule.
(2012) [74] and Carrasco-Galego and Rubio [14] find that non-coordinated policies are associated
to a better policy outcome.
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In Table 2.9 we compare the case in which the two authorities coordinate with the case of
non-coordination, namely when one authority acts as ”leader” and therefore optimizes first,
followed by the other authority, which instead behaves as ”follower”. Interestingly enough, it
emerges that the case of coordination is Pareto-improving, delivering higher social welfare (-
124.7088) than when central bank optimizes first (-124.7110) and when instead the leader is the
macroprudential authority (-124.7095).
2.6.3 Social welfare function
Results drawn so far are based on a social welfare criterion, according to which welfare measures
specific to both type of agents are aggregated. Fundamental is the way through which these
measures enter the social welfare function (2.35). Thus far we have assumed that these two
are equally weighted, so that µ = 0.5. We now investigate to what degree the welfare analysis
changes as long as the different weights are assigned to agents’ welfare measure. Table 10 reports
the cases in which savers’ welfare is assumed to have a larger (µ = 0.75) and a smaller (µ = 0.25)
weight. Importantly, the latter case reflects the case considered by Lambertini et al. (2013)[49]
and Carrasco-Gallego and Rubio (2014)[14], where borrowers’ welfare is given a more sizeable
weight in social welfare function29.
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It clearly arises that when savers’ welfare matters more in social welfare function, namely
when µ = 0.75, the optimal macroprudential policy implies that the financial amplification
mechanism that works through the collateral is fully cushioned, as household debt is only related
to borrowers’ labor income (γ? = 0). As a result, the countercyclical DTI has now the largest
impact on the economy. By contrast, when borrowers’ welfare matters to a larger extent (µ =
0.25), credit supply decision would be entirely driven by real estate values (γ? = 0), and thus a
countercyclical rule for the cap on DTI would play no role. Obviously, in this scenario financial
29In particular, these works assume that weights to savers and borrowers’ welfare are assigned in a way that
the planner equalizes utility across savers and borrowers in case of an equal constant consumption stream. Thus,
social welfare function is written as: V ≡ (1−βs)V s+(1−βb)V b. In our framework, adopting this formulation
for social welfare would imply that borrowers’ welfare is given a weight which is approximately equal to (1-µ) =
0.92.
stability would become problematic, as shocks in the housing market fully impact on household
debt.
2.7 Concluding remarks
The recent financial crisis has sparked many debates concerning the main cause that presumably
led the financial system to collapse in such tremendous way. Undoubtedly, one of this cause is
the credit boom that occurred prior to the crisis. Regarding this, it has become common belief
that in order to safeguard the stability of the financial system and to keep under control sys-
temic risks an excessive growth of households debt must be averted. We have found that, in
principle, this task can be better attained by imposing that credit supply must depend on labor
income to a larger extent than how much occurred in US before the burst of the crisis, based
on our estimates. Thus, a macroprudential authority should first establish that credit supply
be more tied to labor income. Then, it follows that a macroprudential cap on DTI, according
to which the authority responds to contingencies in a rule-based manner, may deliver a good
performance.
Crucially, the implementation of an efficient macroprudential policy leads to redefine the role of
monetary policy during a credit boom. In this regard, we have inquired the conduct of monetary
policy when central bank shares the stage with a macroprudential authority that implements
the policy of our interest (rule for cap on DTI). Therefore, a standard Taylor-like monetary
policy rule performs better when accompanied by a macroprudential rule for the cap on DTI,
when this is designed to stabilize household debt.
Should central bank be also concerned about financial stability during a credit boom ? Accord-
ing to many commentators, central bank may well be able to stabilize financial variables by
implementing a policy called ”leaning against the wind”, that is raising the policy rate when
financial variables become over-heated. Contrasting this view, our analysis leads to conclude
that the strategy in which central bank ”leans against the wind” of a likely credit boom is
welfare-dominated by the one in which the goal of financial stability is uniquely assigned to a
macroprudential authority that implements the optimal rule for the cap on DTI, whereas cen-
tral bank is only left its primary goal of price stability. Nonetheless, the best-performing policy
turns out to be a combination of ”leaning against the wind” and macroprudential policy, so that
private debt is extraordinarily stabilized, at the cost of bearing bigger variability of inflation
and output.
To conclude, the analysis has revealed that, to avoid a new credit boom to occur again credit
supply must take into account borrowers’ labor income to a larger extent than before the cri-
sis. Recent trends in macroprudential regulation seem to suggest that this represents a quite
plausible way for years to come.
Tables
Table 2.1: Model calibration.
Parameter (description) Value
βs (savers discount factor) 0.9975
βb (borrowers discount factor) 0.97
Π¯ (inflation target) 1.005
ψ (inverse of Frisch elast. of labor) 1
χ (savers’ share in production) 0.5
 (s.s. elasticity among goods) 6
m (loan-to-value ratio) 0.85
j (housing weight in utility function) 0.03
H¯ (housing supply) 1
α (capital share in production) 0.33
δ (capital depreciation) 0.025
Steady state ratios Value
C/Y (consumption/GDP) 0.75
I/Y (investment/GDP) 0.25
QH/4Y (housing wealth/GDP) 1.53
Table 2.2: Prior distribution of model parameters and shocks.
Parameter (description) Distribution Mean St.Deviation
γs (savers’ consumption habit) Beta 0.7 0.1
γb (borrowers’ consumption habit) Beta 0.7 0.1
θ (frequency of price adjustment) Beta 0.5 0.075
φ (capital adjustment cost) Gamma 5 2
τ (cap on debt-to-income ratio) Beta 0.5 0.25
γ (weight of collateral in borr. constr.) Beta 0.5 0.25
rr (Taylor rule) Beta 0.75 0.1
rpi (Taylor rule) Normal 1.5 0.25
ry (Taylor rule) Normal 0.125 0.025
ρz (persistence demand shock) Beta 0.7 0.1
ρa (persistence techn. shock) Beta 0.7 0.1
ρj (persistence hous. pref. shock) Beta 0.7 0.1
ρζ (persistence mon.pol. shock) Beta 0.7 0.1
ρ (persistence mark up shock) Beta 0.7 0.1
σz (st.dev. demand shock) Inv. Gamma 0.01 1
σa (st.dev. techn. shock) Inv. Gamma 0.01 1
σj (st.dev. hous.pref. shock) Inv. Gamma 0.01 1
σζ (st.dev. mon.pol. shock) Inv. Gamma 0.01 1
σ (st.dev. mark up shock) Inv. Gamma 0.01 1
Table 2.3: Posterior distribution estimates of model parameters and shocks.
Parameter (description) Mean 10 % Median 90 %
γs (savers consumption habit) 0.86 0.73 0.85 0.93
γb (borrowers consumption habit) 0.34 0.26 0.35 0.48
θ (frequency of price adjustment) 0.60 0.53 0.61 0.71
φ (capital adjustment cost) 11.07 7.20 11.15 14.85
τ (cap on debt-to-income ratio) 0.51 0.08 0.53 0.89
γ (weight of collateral in the borr. constr.) 0.98 0.96 0.98 1.00
rR (Taylor rule) 0.51 0.43 0.51 0.61
rpi (Taylor rule) 2.11 1.81 2.13 2.47
rY (Taylor rule) 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.16
ρz (persistence demand shock) 0.73 0.66 0.72 0.82
ρa (persistence technology shock) 0.82 0.74 0.82 0.89
ρj (persistence housing pref. shock) 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00
ρζ (persistence mon.pol. shock) 0.61 0.52 0.60 0.70
ρ (persistence mark up shock) 0.87 0.83 0.86 0.91
σz (st.dev. demand shock) 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007
σa (st.dev. techn. shock) 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
σj (st.dev. hous. pref. shock) 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.018
σζ (st.dev. mon. pol. shock) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
σ (st.dev. mark up shock) 0.064 0.044 0.069 0.083
Table 2.4: Data vs. model: moments matching. Moments are obtained by simulating
100000 artificial time series, setting parameters to the posterior mean.
Stand. deviation (%) Autocorrelation
Data Model Data Model
Consumption 0.96 0.79 0.97 0.91
Investment 0.86 0.93 0.98 0.99
Inflation 0.09 0.13 0.68 0.88
Int. rate 0.15 0.16 0.89 0.94
House prices 2.55 2.60 0.95 0.98
Table 2.5: Identifiability exercise (SGU (2012)). Estimates of posterior mean using data
(in second column) and artificial simulated time series (third column) as model observable. In
the latter case, simulated series are obtained by setting parameter to the posterior mean and
simulating the model for a number of periods equal to the dataset (58 obsevations).
Parameter (description) Data
Simulated
series
γs (savers consumption habit) 0.86 0.58
γb (borrowers consumption habit) 0.34 0.71
θ (frequency of price adjustment) 0.60 0.45
φ (capital adjustment cost) 11.07 7.18
τ (cap on debt-to-income ratio) 0.51 0.50
γ (weight of collateral in the borr. constr.) 0.98 0.95
rR (Taylor rule) 0.51 0.24
rpi (Taylor rule) 2.11 2.37
rY (Taylor rule) 0.11 0.15
ρz (persistence demand shock) 0.73 0.75
ρa (persistence technology shock) 0.82 0.73
ρj (persistence housing pref. shock) 0.99 0.98
ρζ (persistence mon.pol. shock) 0.61 0.64
ρ (persistence mark up shock) 0.87 0.70
σz (st.dev. demand shock) 0.006 0.004
σa (st.dev. techn. shock) 0.006 0.004
σj (st.dev. hous. pref. shock) 0.016 0.032
σζ (st.dev. mon. pol. shock) 0.001 0.001
σ (st.dev. mark up shock) 0.064 0.066
Table 2.6: Welfare measures and standard deviation (in percentage) of main variables. In
parenthesis consumption equivalent is reported. For the estimated model, all parameters are set
to their posterior mean, apart from those that are calibrated. Standard deviation of shocks is
set to the posterior mean.
Welfare Stand. deviation (%)
V V s V b Y pi Q bb
Estimated -124.8217
-215.6659
(-)
-33.9775
(-) 1.74 0.14 48.68 29.24
Macroprudential DTI
(γ? = 0.79, τ?b = 3) -124.7534
-215.2349
(0.7726)
-33.2719
(-1.3293) 1.67 0.13 44.85 12.04
Macropr. (only γ)
(γ? = 0.79) -124.8035
-215.2692
(0.7109)
-33.3377
(-1.6239) 1.71 0.13 44.96 15.01
Macropr. (only τ?b )
(τ?b = 3) -124.8150
-215.5817
(0.1505)
-34.0434
(-0.2991) 1.73 0.14 48.66 28.66
Table 2.7: Welfare measures and standard deviation (in percentage) of main variables. In
parenthesis consumption equivalent is reported. Standard deviation of shocks is set to the
posterior mean.
Welfare Stand. deviation (%)
V V s V b Y pi Q bb
Optim. Taylor Rule (TR)
(r?y = 0, r
?
pi = 4.34) -124.7813
-215.5657
(0.1791)
-33.9770
(-0.0886) 1.90 0.07 48.79 29.75
LAW
(r?y = 0, r
?
pi = 6.00, r
?
b = 0.42) -124.7185
-215.3877
(0.4980)
-34.0492
(-0.3254) 3.96 0.36 59.33 11.70
Optim. TR + DTI
(γ? = 0.78, τ?b = 3,
r?y = 0, r
?
pi = 3.23) -124.7088
-215.1063
(1.0043)
-34.3113
(-1.5058) 1.91 0.08 44.75 12.18
LAW + DTI
(γ? = 0.78, τ?b = 3
r?y = 0, r
?
pi = 6.00, r
?
b = 0.22) -124.6492
-214.9475
(1.2911)
-34.3508
(-1.7004) 3.03 0.25 51.77 7.65
Table 2.8: Welfare measures and standard deviation (in percentage) of main variables. In
parenthesis consumption equivalent is reported. Standard deviation of shocks is set to the
posterior mean.
Welfare Stand. deviation (%)
V V s V b Y pi Q bb
LTV
(γ? = 0.78,m?b = 3.00) -124.7559
-215.2250
(0.7904)
-34.2868
(-1.3961) 1.69 0.13 42.66 1.74
DTI
(γ? = 0.79, τ?b = 3) -124.7534
-215.2349
(0.7726)
-33.2719
(-1.3293) 1.67 0.13 44.85 12.04
LTV + DTI
(γ? = 0.78,m?b = 3.00, τ
?
b = 3.00 ) -124.7551
-215.2231
(0.7938)
-34.2871
(-1.3974) 1.69 0.13 42.69 1.69
Table 2.9: Welfare measures and standard deviation (in percentage) of main variables. In
parenthesis consumption equivalent is reported. Standard deviation of shocks is set to the
posterior mean.
Welfare Stand. deviation (%)
V V s V b Y pi Q bb
Coordination -124.7088
-215.1063
(1.0043)
-34.3113
(-1.5058) 1.91 0.08 44.75 12.18
DTI first -124.7095
-215.1259
(0.9794)
-34.2933
(-1.4283) 1.88 0.05 44.85 12.81
TR first -124.7110
-215.1119
(0.9942)
-34.3100
(-1.5000) 1.91 0.08 44.75 12.18
Table 2.10: Optimal macroprudential policy for different values of µ.
Optimal Macropr. Policy
µ = 0.5 γ? = 0.79, τ?b = 3
µ = 0.75 γ? = 0, τ?b = 3
µ = 0.25 γ? = 1
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Chapter 3
Money-Financed Fiscal Stimulus as
an Optimal Stabilization Policy
3.1 Introduction
Despite it has been considered a taboo for a long time, the idea of financing an increase in deficit
with a permanent increase in monetary base has returned back to the center of the public debate.
This is an old-fashioned idea, that dates back to the original proposal of ”helicopter money”
(Friedman (1969) [28]) and regained new interest after Japan fell into a ”liquidity trap” at the
end of 90’s1. This idea is now revived, as a consequence of prolonged stagnation experienced by
some country. Although since the end of the crisis central banks have engaged in wide programs
of unconventional monetary policies, in some country output is still below the potential and
deflation is still far from disappearing2. Therefore, some commentators have begun advocating
another unorthodox monetary policy measure, consisting in financing a fiscal stimulus, and
thus the implied increase in deficit, with emission of money, without depending on public-debt
financing3.
In this regard, in the present paper we build a model that provides a role for both unconventional
monetary policy and a potential simultaneous fiscal expansion. Crucial for the implementation
of a money-financed fiscal stimulus is the commitment of the cooperation government-central
bank. We highlight the importance of this, by characterizing a Ramsey problem under full
commitment. Remarkably, we find that the optimal policy mix under full commitment involves
1One of the most prominent advocate of this idea at that time was the former Fed chief Ben Bernanke, who
had a speech in 2003 in which he argued for an expansionary fiscal policy ”explicitly coupled with incremental
Bank of Japan purchases of government debt” so that the expansion of deficit is in effect financed by money
creation (see Bernanke (2003)[8]).
2As discussed in Chapter 1, this is the case of Japan and Eurozone.
3This policy has been greatly supported by Turner (2013 [76], 2015 [77]). See also related discussions in
Reichlin et al. (2013)[63], Giavazzi and Tabellini (2014)[31]
a money-financed fiscal stimulus, which enables to stabilize the economy in a more efficient way
than other policies do. In other words, the optimal commitment says that central bank expands
the amount of reserves supplied to finance a simultaneous rise in government spending.
The optimal money-financed fiscal stimulus is implemented in a specific way: public spending
increases in a countercyclical fashion the period in which the recessionary shock takes place, and
then reverts back to the steady state the subsequent period, when output gap in closed; money
supply instead is expanded to a larger extent than government spending and then is sluggishly
withdrawn.
We discuss the properties of this optimal money-financed fiscal stimulus by looking at alternative
policies that have been commonly adopted in the real world or widely suggested in the literature.
Particularly fascinating, in light of the recent unconventional policies implemented in some
country, is the comparison with the case of an optimal monetary policy in combination with
constant government spending. The rationale of this analysis is the fact that, in the current
scenario, unconventional monetary policies have not been accompanied by expansionary fiscal
policy because of concerns of already-high levels of public debt. Interestingly enough, we show
that when the unconventional monetary policy is accompanied by a fiscal stimulus the optimal
stabilization improves considerably. In this case, the policymaker would commit to expand
money supply and reduce the amount of public debt held by the private sector.
We then compare our optimal policy with the case in which optimal government spending is fully
financed with public debt, with no use of money. We find that in this case of ”passive” monetary
policy the economy may experience persistent recession and deflation. Thus, debt-financing a
fiscal stimulus turns out to be a noticeably sub-optimal policy.
Importantly, ”active” monetary policies that feature an increase in money supply in order to
attain a pre-specified target perform far better. In particular, in case of a standard Taylor
rule regime, complementing the monetary injection with an optimal fiscal stimulus attains,
surprisingly, as an efficient stabilization effect as in the case of optimal policy. Furthermore, since
a money-financed fiscal stimulus prevents deflation, the policy rate is not cut to the zero lower
bound but rather remains quite stable. Two other ”active” monetary policies are ”inflation-
targeting” policy and ”nominal GDP targeting” policy. Under these regimes, as long as the
increase in money supply, required to achieve the monetary policy target, is complemented with
an optimal increase in public spending, output gap and inflation are greatly stabilized and the
interest rate on reserves is not necessarily lowered. However, this occurs at the cost of engineering
a more pronounced increase of government spending, which offsets the fall in private spending.
The scenario is an economy hit by a ”liquidity shock”. ”Liquidity” is intended as in Lagos
(2010)[48] and Benigno and Nistico` (2017)[5], that is the degree by which assets are accepted
to purchase goods. When the property of exchengeability of these assets worsens, we are in
presence of a ”liquidity shock”, which translates into a contraction in nominal spending4.
A liquidity shock of this sort reflects what happened in the recent financial crisis, especially in
US and Eurozone, where a large fraction of assets have lost the property of being store of value
and having perfect resaleability5. Particularly in the Eurozone, the liquidity crisis has regarded
those assets deemed as safest, like sovereign bonds (International Monetary Fund (2012), ch. 3
[29]).
Accordingly, our model features a financial friction in which both money and a given fraction of
government bonds are accepted to purchase goods, but the latter may face a sudden deterioration
of their value, making them lose value when purchasing goods. This perturbation sharply impairs
the economy, producing recession and deflation, and the zero lower bound becomes a constraint
for monetary policy. In this framework, the optimal policy mix turns out to be a money-financed
fiscal stimulus.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the representative-agent model
used for our analysis. Section 3.3 characterizes the optimal monetary-fiscal policy. Section 3.4
discusses about the performance of several monetary policies. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes
main results and concludes.
3.1.1 Related literature
The paper closest to our work is Gal`ı (2017) [30]. The author analyses the effects of a money-
financed fiscal stimulus in a standard textbook New Keynesian model. He compares the effects
of money-financing an increase in government spending or a reduction in taxes with the effects of
financing these stimuli by issuing public debt. He shows that, both in normal times and in case
of a liquidity trap, a money-financed fiscal stimulus produces a stronger stimulative effect on
the economy. Importantly, to configure a money-financed fiscal stimulus Gal`ı (2017)[30] assumes
that there is a rule according to which government keeps public debt unchanged. We depart
from this paper in that we find money-financed fiscal stimulus to be an optimal policy mix, that
is the best policy outcome of a Ramsey problem with full commitment, rather than a policy rule.
In our paper, the policymaker can choose to finance government spending either with money or
with public debt, and it eventually opts for using money. Therefore, both government spending
and money are endogenous, depending on the choice of the Ramsey policymaker. From a model
perspective, our model differs from Gal`ı (2017)[30] in two important aspects. Firstly, he provides
4The idea that shortage of safe assets and therefore a disequilibrium in the financial market reflects into shortage
of demand for goods has been discussed, among the others, by De Long (2010) [18], following the original idea by
Mill (1829) [58].
5See Caballero (2010) [13], Credit Suisse (2011)[71].
a role for money by introducing it in the utility function, whereas we consider a cash in advance
constraint, according to which money is used to purchase goods in a goods market. Secondly,
in Gal`ı (2017)[30] the shock that triggers the liquidity trap is a shock to the natural rate of
interest, whereas we focus on a liquidity shock.
Buiter (2014) [12] is another work that deals with the effects of ”helicopter money” in a DSGE
model. He argues that this policy has a positive impact on nominal spending because of ”irre-
deemability” of money. Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005)[2] discuss the impact of unconventional
monetary policy when the economy is in liquidity trap. He finds that a permanent increase
of money supply raises output and inflation to the extent to which the increase of money is
perceived as permanent by agents.
Our paper is also related to works that study optimal monetary and fiscal policy under commit-
ment at the zero lower bound, in particular when fiscal policy involves the choice of government
spending. Eggertson (2001) [21] proves that in a standard New Keynesian model real government
spending can be a powerful tool when the economy falls in a liquidity trap. When interest rate
is at zero level, a benevolent government can in principle use real spending to close the output
gap. He underscores the fact that government spending can be used to stabilize the economy
also when the policymaker cannot credibly commit to future policy actions. Similarly, Schmidt
(2013) [65] shows that in a standard New Keynesian model optimal policy under commitment
calls for a countercyclical role of government spending, that allows to mitigate recession and
subsequent overshooting of the target. This last argument is strong enough to claim that fiscal
policy can be preferred to monetary policy for stabilizing output. By the same token, Nakata
(2013) [59] argues that the increase in government spending required to close the output gap
under commitment is more sizeable in case of uncertainty rather than in a deterministic model.
All these works acknowledge an effective countercylical role for public spending when the inter-
est rate reaches the zero level. In our paper we show that this result is even stronger when the
fiscal stimulus is financed with money.
Regarding the model presented in the paper, we draw an economy which is hit by a liquidity
shock. We model liquidity shock in the same vein as in Benigno and Nistico` (2017)[5]. They use
a model featuring liquidity shocks to analyse the implications of monetary policy. Main result
is that there is an important role for the expansion of central bank’s balance sheet to make up
for the shortage of safe assets. A significant departure from their model is that they draw an
economy split by borrowers and savers, where borrowing occurs through financial intermedia-
tion. Thus, the loss of value of assets that give rise to the liquidity crisis regards assets that
are issued by the private sector. Conversely, we model a standard representative agent model,
where bonds are supplied by the treasury. This implies that, unlike their paper, the liquidity
shock impacts on government bonds.
Other papers include a liquidity shock in their models. In particualar, Kiyotaki and Moore
(2012)[46] and Del Negro et al. (2012)[19] build an economy in which money and equity have
different degree of pledgeability, as equity can suddenly face a deterioration of value. However,
in these models assets are used by entrepreneurs to finance their investment decision rather than
in the goods market.
Finally, related works are also those who study fiscal policy at the zero lower bound. In this
strand of literature, Krugman (1998)[47], Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2010)[15], Eg-
gertson (2010)[22] represent some prominent works documenting that fiscal policy is more effec-
tive when interest rate are at zero level.
3.2 The model
We present an almost standard New Keynesian DSGE model, featuring households, firms com-
peting in monopolistic competitive firms, government and central bank. A crucial feature of
the model is the presence of a financial friction, designed as a cash-in-advance constraint, which
guarantees a motive (liquidity properties) for holding money6.
3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of size one. A representative household is provided with the
following life-time expected utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ + ωg
G1−σ
g
t
1− σg −
∫ 1
0 N
1+η
t (i)di
1 + η
]
(3.1)
where Ct ≡
[∫ 1
0 Ct(i)

−1di
] −1

and Gt ≡
[∫ 1
0 Gt(i)

−1di
] −1

are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for
consumption and public spending, which aggregate the demand for goods, from households
and government, over all i goods in the economy. Government spending enters utility function
scaled by the parameter ωg. The elasticity of substitution among the different varieties of
goods demanded is given by  and assumed to be greater than one ( > 1). The representative
household supplies all i’s good-specific unit of labor Nt(i).
The timing of the economy says that goods market opens first, followed by assets market. As
in Benigno and Nistico` (2017)[5], we assume that at generic time ”t” in the goods market
6A financial friction modelled in this way is in line with seminal works by Lucas (1982, 1984)[52] [53].
households use money and a fraction 0 ≤ ξt ≤ 1 of government bonds carried from the previous
period to purchase goods7. Thus, this cash-in-advance constraint is assumed:
Mt−1(1 + imt−1) + ξtBt−1(1 + it−1) ≥ PtCt (3.2)
where Mt−1 is nominal money held from the previous period, paying the interest rate imt−1, and
Bt−1 are nominal one-period government bonds issued in the secondary market and paying the
interest rate it−1. Both money and government bonds are safe assets, in the sense that they are
perfect store of value, as they are remunerated at their risk-free nominal interest rate. Moreover,
money and a fraction ξt of bonds are also liquid assets, because they are accepted in the goods
market as a medium of exchange to purchase goods. Thus, they differ in the fact that not all
government bonds are liquid assets, but only a fraction ξt of them.
Furthermore, we assume that this fraction of bonds may experience sudden deterioration of their
value. This reflects the ”liquidity shock” in our economy: a shock to the variable ξt implies that
fewer safe assets are accepted to purchase goods in the goods market and therefore we have a
contraction of liquidity8. We assume that the variable ξt follows an AR(1) process in deviation
from the steady state:
ξˆt = ρξˆt−1 + εt (3.3)
with ξˆt ≡ log(ξt/ξ), where ξ is the steady state value and εt is an i.i.d. innovation with εt ∼
N(0, σ2ξ ).
After goods market closes assets market opens, so that households can allocate their resources
(money unspent in the goods market, labor income and profits’ shares) to purchase assets and
to save some money, which is needed to buy consumption goods in the next period, when the
goods market will be open again. Hence, per-period budget constraint is written in the following
way:
Mt +Bt = (1− ξt)Bt−1(1 + it−1) +
[
Mt−1(1 + imt−1) + ξtBt−1(1 + it−1)− PtCt
]
+
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Nt(i)di+ Γt − PtT¯ (3.4)
where Γt are nominal profits obtained by holding firms’ shares. We assume that the government
levies a constant lump-sum tax T¯ on households. This is required in order to guarantee a primary
surplus for government in steady state and thus does not play any role in the dynamics of the
7In this paper we consider as ”money” central bank’s reserves and therefore we call ”money” and ”reserves”
interchangeably. This is equivalent to assume that currency, which pays no interest, is negligible.
8As in Lagos (2010)[48] and Benigno and Nistico` (2017)[5] ”liquidity” here has the interpretation of the
”degree of acceptance” of the assets, which can be an intrinsic time-varying property of the asset itself or a
feature attributed by the ”market”.
model.
It must be noted that an important feature of the model is that central bank’s money pays an
interest rate. This is consistent with reality: since 2008 central banks in countries like US and
Japan have been paying an interest rate on current account balances (reserves or ”high-powered”
money) held at central bank. In our model, this interest rate corresponds to the policy rate9.
Concerning the relation with the interest rate on bonds, the following inequalities hold:
it ≥ imt ≥ 0. (3.5)
In fact, since central bank ”high-powered” money is the safest asset in the economy, nobody
should be allowed to borrow at a rate lower than the one central bank pays on its liabilities,
consisting this in a clear arbitrage opportunity. Besides, we take into account the zero lower
bound on the interest rate on reserves.
Hence, households utility maximization problem consists of maximizing utility (3.1) under the
budget constraint (3.4) and the cash-in-advance constraint (3.2). Complementary slackness
condition related to the cash-in-advance constraint is given by:
φt ≥ 0 φt
[
Mt−1(1 + imt−1) + ξtBt−1(1 + it−1)− PtCt
]
= 0. (3.6)
where φt ≥ 0 is a Lagrange multiplier. The problem is solved by taking the first-order conditions
with respect to the control variables, that are consumption, bonds, money and labor. We can
neglect corner solution and denote with λt > 0 the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget
constraint, therefore we get:
C−σt = (λt + φt)Pt (3.7)
λt = β(1 + it)Et(λt+1 + ξt+1φt+1) (3.8)
λt = β(1 + i
m
t )Et(λt+1 + φt+1) (3.9)
Nηt (i) = λtWt(i). (3.10)
We can now combine (3.7)-(3.9) so as to yield the equations characterizing the spread:
it − imt
1 + it
Et
[
C−σt+1
Pt+1
]
= Et
{
(1− ξt+1)γt+1
[
C−σt+1
Pt+1
]}
(3.11)
9This implies that there is no corridor between interest rates, so that the interest rate that central bank pays
on its liabilities coincides with the policy rate and also with the interest rate on marginal lending facility. This is
not of practical relevance in our framework.
γt = 1− β(1 + imt )Et
{
C−σt+1
C−σt
Pt
Pt+1
}
. (3.12)
Due to the timing of the economy, the spread at time ”t” affects the intertemporal subistution of
consumption across time ”t+ 1” and ”t+ 2”. By looking at equations (3.8) and (3.9), in periods
when φt+1 = 0 (when the complementary slackness condition (3.6) is relaxed), we get it = i
m
t ,
so that there is no differential between the interest rate on bonds and the interest on reserves.
This implies that money and bonds become perfect substitutes and their total amount held by
the representative agent exceeds the level required to purchase goods in the goods market. In
this case equation (3.12) boils down to a standard Euler equation. Interestingly, this case occurs
also when ξt+1 = 1, namely when all assets can be used for transaction purposes.
Using conditions (3.7),(3.9),(3.10) and (3.12) we obtain the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor:
Nηt (i)C
σ
t = (1− γt)
Wt(i)
Pt
. (3.13)
The variable (1− γt) is a consequence of the monetary friction and represents a wedge between
the marginal rate of substitution and real wage. In order to fully characterize the equilibrium
of the model we need a transversality condition that prevents household from dying with bonds
and money left over:
lim
T→∞
Et
[
βT−tλT (BT +MT )
]
= 0 (3.14)
where λT = C
−σ
T /PT − φT is the marginal utility of nominal wealth.
3.2.2 Firms
We assume that the economy features a continuum of firms of size one, each producing one
differentiated good. The production function is linear in labor: Yt(i) = Nt(i).
Firms set price as in Calvo’s model, that is a only a generic fraction 1−θ of firms with 0 < θ ≤ 1
can change its price at any future period T with probability θT−t, whereas the remaining fraction
θ of firms do not change the price. Profit maximization problem is set up as:
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
(θβ)T−tλT
[
Pt(j)
PT
YT (i)(1 + τ)− WT (i)
PT
YT (i)
]}
where τ is a government subsidy aimed at eliminating the distortions of the economy. Firms
maximize this profit function subject to the demand function, which is:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Yt (3.15)
where aggregate output in real terms is given by:
Yt = Ct +Gt. (3.16)
First order condition of the above problem delivers:
P ∗t
Pt
= µ
Et
{∑∞
T=t(θβ)
T−tλT
(
PT
Pt
)
WT (i)
PT
YT
}
Et
{∑∞
T=t(θβ)
T−tλT
(
PT
Pt
)−1
YT
} (3.17)
where µ ≡ /(( − 1)(1 + τ)) and in equilibrium Pt(i) = P ∗t , because all firms set their price
equal to the optimal one.
In this last condition we can use (3.13) along with the demand function (3.15) and the resource
constraint (3.16) so as to get:
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1+η
= µ
Et
{∑∞
T=t(θβ)
T−tλT
(
PT
Pt
)(1+η)
(YT (i))
ηYT
}
Et
{∑∞
T=t(θβ)
T−tλT
(
PT
Pt
)−1
YT (CT )−σ(1− γT )
} (3.18)
where it can be noted the impact of the financial friction through the variable (1−γt). Moreover,
Calvo assumption implies that the aggregate price level follows the law of motion:
P 1−t = (1− θ)P ∗1−t + θP 1−t−1 . (3.19)
From the equation above we can obtain the law of motion for the index of price dispersion:
∆t = θ (Πt)
(1+η) ∆t−1 + (1− θ)
(
1− θ (Πt)−1
1− θ
) (1+η)
−1
(3.20)
where price dispersion is defined as: ∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−(1+η)
di. Finally, using (3.15) and the
definition of production function and price dispersion we obtain that aggregate labor and output
are related as:
Yt∆t = Nt (3.21)
so that the policymaker has to keep track of price dispersion when studying welfare effects of
different policies.
3.2.3 Government and Central Bank’s budget constraint
We assume that government purchases consumption goods and subsidizes firms’ revenues. In
order to pay for this expenditure, government levies a constant lump-sum tax T¯ and issues
public debt in form of short-term government bonds (in nominal terms) BGt , paying the interest
rate it. These bonds are issued in the secondary market and so are purchased by central bank
and households.
We denote the total amount held by household as Bt whereas bonds held by central bank are
BCt . Therefore, market clearing for bonds reads:
BGt = Bt +B
C
t . (3.22)
Furthermore, government receives a real transfer St from central bank, through which this latter
rebates its profits to the government. Thus, we implicitly assume that all central bank’s profits
are rebated to the government through the transfer St. Budget constraint of government is
therefore given by:
Pt(Gt − T¯ + τYt) +BGt−1(1 + it) = BGt + PtSt. (3.23)
Regarding central bank, its budget constraint in nominal terms reads:
BCt +M
C
t−1(1 + i
m
t−1) = B
C
t−1(1 + it−1) +M
C
t − PtSt (3.24)
where BCt denotes central bank’s holding of public debt and M
C
t is central bank money. Thus,
the central bank’s balance sheet features government bonds as the only asset and money the
only liability. We can combine the two budget constraints by substituting for the transfer and
using market clearing condition for bonds (3.22) so as to get the consolidated budget constraint:
Pt(Gt − T¯ + τYt) = Bt −Bt−1(1 + it−1) +MCt −MCt−1(1 + imt−1). (3.25)
On the left we have the deficit of the government whereas on the right the ways of financing it,
namely variation in nominal money (seigniorage revenues) and variation of public debt issued
to the private sector. Further, we can define the deficit Dt ≡ (Gt − T¯ + τYt) and impose
the transversality condition (3.14) so as to obtain the intertemporal budget constraint of the
consolidated government-central bank:
Et
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
λT
λt
PTDT = Et
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
λT
λt
iT − imT
1 + imT
MT −Bt−1(1 + it−1)−MCt−1(1 + imt−1). (3.26)
This intertemporal equation allows to underscore the fact that the present value of deficit must
be financed by the present value of future seigniorage revenues minus the initial stock of bonds
held by private sector and central bank’s money.
3.2.4 Market clearing and equilibrium conditions
In the market for reserves demand and supply must equalize, so that:
Mt = M
C
t . (3.27)
We recall also the condition of equilibrium in the bonds market:
BGt = Bt +B
C
t . (3.28)
We now report a summary of the equilibrium conditions of the model. On the demand side, we
have the equations characterizing the spread between the market interest rate and the interest
rate on reserves:
it − imt
1 + it
Et
[
C−σt+1
Pt+1
]
= Et
{
(1− ξt+1)γt+1
[
C−σt+1
Pt+1
]}
(3.29)
γt = 1− β(1 + imt )Et
{
(Ct+1)
−σ
(Ct)−σΠt+1
}
. (3.30)
The cash-in-advance constraint in real terms is expressed as:
mt−1(1 + imt−1)
Πt
+
ξtbt−1(1 + it−1)
Πt
= Ct. (3.31)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1, bt ≡ Bt/Pt, mt ≡Mt/Pt. As for the supply side of our economy, we obtain
the following conditions: (
1− θ (Πt)−1
1− θ
) 1+η
−1
=
Ft
Kt
(3.32)
Ft = µλtY
1+η
t ∆
η
t + θβEt
{
Ft+1 (Πt+1)
(1+η)
}
(3.33)
Kt = λtYtC
−σ
t (1− γt) + θβEt {Kt+1 (Πt+1)} . (3.34)
Price dispersion evolves as:
∆t = θ (Πt)
(1+η) ∆t−1 + (1− θ)
(
1− θ (Πt)−1
1− θ
) (1+η)
−1
. (3.35)
The resource constraint is given by:
Yt = Ct +Gt. (3.36)
Finally, consolidated budget constraint of treasury and central bank in real terms becomes:
Gt − T¯ + τYt = bt − bt−1(1 + it−1)
Πt
+
MCt
Pt
− M
C
t−1(1 + imt−1)
Pt
(3.37)
where we have used market clearing condition (3.27) of reserves.
Therefore, given the exogenous processes of {ξt} and initial value of variables
{
mt0−1, bt0−1, it0−1, imt0−1,∆t0−1
}
,
an equilibrium of the model is a set of stochastic processes
{Yt, Ct,Πt, Pt, Ft,Kt,∆t, γt, it, imt ,mt, bt, Gt}∞t=t0
that solve the set of equations (3.29)-(3.37) along with transversality condition (3.14) and the
definition of inflation Πt = Pt/Pt−1 . Thus, there are nine equations and twelve unknowns, so
that we are left with three variables object of policy. We can now spell out our definition of
policies, that we are going to use from here onwards.
• A monetary policy is a choice of two of the following three instruments {it, imt ,Mt}∞t=t0 .
• A government spending policy is a choice of the process of real government spending
{Gt}∞t=t0 .
• Therefore, a monetary-government spending policy is the choice of two of the fol-
lowing three instruments {it, imt ,Mt}∞t=t0 along with the choice of {Gt}∞t=t0 .
The specification of monetary policy represents a sharp departure from the standard assumption
of a central bank steering only the interest rate object of monetary policy. Under the standard
assumption, there is only one monetary policy instrument: the policy rate. In this case, open
market operations allow central bank to achieve the target for the policy rate and so they must
be consistent with the chosen level of the policy rate. In other words, money supply is strictly
dependent on the policy rate set by central bank.
In our model, instead, central bank can set both the policy rate and money supply, without
this latter being dependent from the former. This pattern resembles the current scenario, where
central banks are contemporaneously steering the policy rate (conventional monetary policy)
and implementing balance-sheet expansions aimed at expanding monetary base (unconventional
monetary policy), so that the supply of reserves is set independently of the policy rate10.
10Some central bank is now paying reserves at a rate that is equal or very close to the target for the overnight
rate. This is - how is called - the ”floor system”, which allows to ”divorce” the supply of reserves from the policy
rate. For a discussion on this point, see Keister et al. (2008) [43] and Goodfriend (2002) [33].
Importantly, this framework provides a role for unconventional monetary policy.
3.3 Optimal stabilization policy
We evaluate optimal government spending-monetary policy with full commitment by solving
a standard Ramsey problem where the welfare criterion is given by the discounted sum of
households’ utility:
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
C1−σt
1− σ + ωg
G1−σ
g
t
1− σg −
Y 1+ηt
1 + η
∆t
]
(3.38)
where we have used (3.21) so that now price dispersion affects our welfare measure11. Using
the linear-quadratic approach developed by Benigno and Woodford (2003) [6] we can derive a
quadratic loss function starting from (3.38) and imposing that the Ramsey policy approximates
an efficient steady state. Then, to compute the Ramsey policy we approximate equilibrium
conditions (3.29)-(3.37) around the deterministic steady state of the model which, under some
restriction, is the efficient one.
It is shown in Appendix that the quadratic loss function becomes:
Et0
{ ∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0Lt
}
Lt ≡ λc(Cˆt)2 + λg(Gˆt)2 + η(Yˆt)2 + λpi(pit)2 (3.39)
where λc, λg, λpi are made up by structural parameters, as shown in Appendix.
Below we show that the first best can be achieved by implementing a particular subsidy to firms’
revenues.
3.3.1 Steady state properties and numerical calibration
The efficient allocation is obtained by a planner maximizing welfare criterion under the resource
constraint (3.36). This problem delivers the efficient allocation in steady state:
C−σ = ωgG−σ
g
= Y η. (3.40)
We now show that with an appropriate choice of the subsidy this allocation can be attained also
in our decentralized economy, when there is no inflation (Π = 1). In fact, from the steady state
11We assume therefore that the consolidated government-central bank is ”benevolent”.
version of equation (3.18) and using condition (3.40) we obtain:
1 =
µ
(1− γ) =

(− 1)(1 + τ)(1− γ) . (3.41)
From this, it emerges that the level of the subsidy required to make the steady state an efficient
one is:
τ =

(− 1)(1− γ) − 1. (3.42)
It is important to note that the subsidy is set to remove both the distortion caused by mo-
nopolistic competition and the one given by the monetary friction. We can now discuss some
properties of this steady state. From equations (3.29) and (3.30), and imposing no inflation
(Π = 1) we can obtain:
i− im
1 + im
= (1− ξ)γ (3.43)
γ = 1− β(1 + im). (3.44)
Therefore, in case in which there is no monetary friction in steady state, that is when γ = 0,
the interest rate differential between money and bonds no longer appears: i = im. This would
correspond to the Friedman rule, where there is no distortion across assets in the economy.
We notice that the Friedman rule case is nested in the efficient steady state of our economy as
well as the case in which a differential between the two rates actually exists. Indeed, combining
equations (3.43) and (3.44) and recalling that 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1, we note that the interest rate on reserves
can attain any level within the range [0, 1/β − 1]. Accordingly, the first best encompasses both
the case in which the interest on reserves is equal to the rate on bonds (i = im) and the case
where the former is lower (i > im)12.
The model is solved by taking a log-linearization of the above equilibrium conditions around the
efficient steady state. The full log-linear model is shown in Appendix. In the simulation of the
following sections we use the parameters reported in Table 3.1. The interest rate on government
bonds is set to 4% per annum whereas the interest rate of reserves to 0.75%, which corresponds
to the value was set by Fed when this rate was introduced in 2008. The discount factor is set
to β = 0.99. We consider a logarithmic utility function in consumption and public spending,
so that σ = σg = 1. The value of the parameter of the Calvo model of price adjustment (θ)
and the elasticity of substitution across goods () are quite standard in the literature. They
imply, respectively, an average duration of prices of four quarters and a frictionless mark-up of
1.2. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity η is set equal to 1 as in Justiniano et al. (2015)[41]
As in Gal`ı (2017)[30], public debt-to-GDP is set to annual 60%, which implies by= 0.6 *4. To
12This is a consequence of the fact that we allow the existence of a subsidy that can be set in a way to eliminate
the monetary friction.
Parameter (description) Value
β (discount factor) 0.99
σ (consumption intert. elasticity) 1
σg (government sp. intert. elast.) 1
σg (weight of gov.sp. in utility) 0.25
η (inverse Frisch elasticity) 1
 (elasticity among goods) 7.66
θ (Calvo frequency price adj.) 0.75
1+i (annual int. rate on bonds) 1.04
1+im (annual int. rate on reserves) 1.0075
sc (consumption share in GDP) 0.8
my (money-to-GDP ratio) 0.125*4
by (public debt-to-GDP ratio) 0.6*4
Table 3.1: Model calibration for numerical solution.
calibrate the steady state money-to-GDP ratio we consider the average velocity of M1 money
in US over the years of the Great Moderation (1984-2007), so that we set my= 0.125*4. Notice
that this calibration implies a fraction of assets usable for transactions in the goods market that
amounts to around 12%. The share of consumption on GDP in US accounts for around 80 per
cent, therefore we set sc = 0.8. Clearly, the share of public spending on GDP is the remaining
20% (sg = 0.2). Accordingly, the weight of public spending in utility function must be set equal
to ωg =0.25. This calibration implies that the steady state percentage level of lump-sum tax in
GDP amounts to 44%.
3.3.2 Optimal monetary-government spending policy with a liq-
uidity shock
In this section we show the optimal responses of the Ramsey policymaker to a liquidity shock13.
As a first exercise we examine the impulse response functions under an optimal monetary-
government spending policy, where all three policy instruments are used. We simulate a one-
period liquidity shock, which causes a 1% deterioration of government bonds14. To investigate
the impact of the magnitude of the shock we report also cases of 2% and 3% liquidity shocks.
Figure 3.1 displays the impulse response functions of the optimal policy.
We can immediately notice that optimal policy entails three features: first, a one-period fiscal
13The complete Ramsey problem is described in Appendix.
14To solve the model, taking into account an occasionally binding zero lower bound, we employ the Occbin
algorithm developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2016)[34].
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Figure 3.1: Optimal monetary-government spending policy for 1%, 2% and 3% liq-
uidity shock. Liquidity process ξˆt is assumed to have persistence ρ = 0.8. Variables are in
percentage deviation from the steady state, apart from the interest rates and the spread between
them, which are expressed in annual percentage points.
stimulus that looks symmetric to the fall in output; second, a large balance-sheet expansion,
which reflects into a sizeable money injection; third, the interest rate on reserves is pushed
downwards to reach the zero lower bound.
Concerning government spending, it can be clearly seen how this draws a path which is counter-
cyclical with respect to the fall in output gap. Indeed, we note that in case of a 1% liquidity shock
the increase in government spending amounts to around 1%, which offsets the fall in output of
quite the same magnitude. In the period after the shock, output is back to potential level and
the fiscal stimulus is therefore fully withdrawn. This countercyclical movement of government
spending when the policy rate has reached the zero lower bound can be found also in Eggertson
(2001)[21], Schmidt (2013)[65] and Nakata (2013)[59]. However, an important difference arises:
unlike these works, here output does not overshoot but rather goes back to potential the period
after the shock.
It must be noted that, in principle, the increase in government spending works against the mini-
mization of the loss function (3.39), as can be clearly noted through the second term in the same
loss function. However, it turns out that the Ramsey policymaker tends to ”bear” an increase
in government spending with the aim of stabilizing the other gaps, given by other terms in the
loss function (3.39). Indeed, in the next counterfactual exercise we will show that this fiscal
stimulus allows output gap and inflation to fall less. Nonetheless, the fact that a fiscal stimulus
is costly for the policymaker can be inferred from the reduction of public spending to the target
the period after the shock, when also the output gap closes.
As for the second feature, it emerges a long-lasting balance-sheet expansion which draws a path
that appears to track symmetrically the liquidity process. In particular, money supply increases
by around 2% on impact and then reverts back slowly, with seemingly the same pace as the
liquidity index. Remarkably, the increase in monetary base is more sizeable than the one in
government spending: in fact, the increase in monetary base doubles that in public spending.
A striking aspect of this optimal money-financed fiscal stimulus is that whereas the fiscal stim-
ulus lasts only the period of the shock, as it reverts back the period later, the injection of
monetary base is prolonged, as it persists until the liquidity shock dies out15. Therefore, we can
argue that this balance-sheet expansion seems to be implemented so as to apparently restore
liquidity in financial system, after the deterioration of bonds in the goods market. This result
can be somehow validated when we let the persistence of the liquidity shock take other values
with respect to the calibrated one (ρ = 0.8). In Figure 3.2, we display also the case of a shock
with low persistence (ρ = 0.4) and the case of very high persistence (ρ = 0.99). It turns out
that there is no impact on the variables of the loss function, that report the same path under all
different degree of persistence. However, there is a sharp difference in the response of nominal
money: when the liquidity shock is highly persistent, the policymaker puts in place a more
sizeable and prolonged increase in monetary base. This feature seems to confirm the fact that
money is supplied so as to restore the liquidity eroded by the loss of value of government bonds.
The increase of monetary base implied by the optimal policy is associated with a sizeable endoge-
nous decrease in public debt held by private sector: in this way, the representative household can
reduce the amount of assets that have lost their value for purchasing goods, and this is replaced
with central bank’s money. This implies that, if the total amount of public debt was constant,
central bank would get to hold (”monetise”) a larger share of public debt. Indeed, by market
clearing condition for bonds market, one can see that, for a given level of public debt issued
by the government, a lower amount held by the private sector translates into a larger portion
held by central bank16. Thus, the commitment government-central bank would be such that the
amount of public debt issued to finance the fiscal stimulus be purchased by central bank.
15Differently, in Gal`ı (2017)[30] public spending is exogenous, following an AR(1) process.
16This can be seen by repeating the above simulation setting BGt = B
G ∀t. In this case, it is clear that the
mirror image of a fall of the amount of public debt held by the private sector is an increase of this purchased by
central bank.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal monetary-government spending policy for different degree of
persistence of the (1%) liquidity shock. Variables are in percentage deviation from the
steady state, apart from the interest rate on reserves and the spread, that are expressed in
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The third feature of the optimal monetary-government spending policy has to do with the in-
terest rate on reserves. This is cut down so as to reach the zero lower bound in the period
when the shock hits the economy. However, it remains at the zero lower bound for a longer
time than the shock. This is a standard result in the literature dealing with optimal monetary
policy at the zero lower bound (see Eggertson and Woodford (2003)[24]). The striking differ-
ence with this literature is that this result is here combined with a balance-sheet expansion17.
Interestingly, due to the cut of the interest rate on reserves, the liquidity shock brings about an
increase in the liquidity premium, namely the spread between the interest rate on government
bonds and the rate on money18. Thus, as in Benigno and Nistico` (2017)[5] the optimal uncon-
ventional monetary policy does not work through the reduction of the liquidity premium, but
rather thorough restoring liquidity, compensating the shortage in safe assets. However, in our
model the increase in the liquidity premium produces two contrasting effects19. On one hand,
higher liquidity premium reflects into lower expected next-period consumption, according to the
Euler equation. One the other hand, an increase in the liquidity premium implies also that
the government is putting in place a sort of additional balance-sheet expansion to stabilize the
17In Eggertson and Woodford (2003)[24] balance-sheet expansions are neutral at the zero lower bound.
18The interest rate on bonds remains very close to the steady state (not shown in Figure 3.1).
19Clearly, the general equilibrium dynamics of the model is more complex than a standard New Keynesian
model because of the transaction friction and the role for the consolidated government-central bank. This implies
that the model can hardly be handled analytically and therefore we rely on numerical methods.
economy20. In fact, in the goods market households are not only provided with new money, but
also with an additional transfer of resources inherited from the previous period, stemming from
a larger spread between government bonds and money.
Overall, the joint effect of these three features of the optimal monetary-government spending
policy delivers a good performance in terms of stabilization of output gap and inflation. Output
gap is fully stabilized in one quarter, owing to the action of government spending. Regarding
inflation, we note that the shock produces only quite negligible fall of inflation (around -0.03%
in case of a 3% liquidity shock) and subsequent overshooting, before stabilizing completely after
two quarters.
Table 3.2 reports the government spending multiplier and the ”monetary multiplier”, indicat-
ing, the impact variation of output due to, respectively, the fiscal stimulus and the monetary
expansion. It can be seen that the government spending multiplier is larger than 1 in absolute
value, in line with literature suggesting a multiplier larger than 1 when interest rates are at zero
level (see, for instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2010)[15], Eggertson (2010)[22]).
Monetary multiplier is instead lower than 1 in absolute value. Notice that the value of this is
increasing in the magnitude of the shock, whereas the fiscal multiplier is decreasing in it.
∣∣∣∆YˆT /∆GˆT ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∆YˆT /∆MˆT ∣∣∣
1% shock 1.2315 0.5942
2% shock 1.2272 0.6080
3% shock 1.2251 0.6123
Table 3.2: Government spending and monetary multiplier under optmimal policy.
3.3.3 Optimal unconventional monetary policy with and with-
out fiscal stimulus
We have shown that the optimal monetary-government spending policy in presence of a liquidity
shock is a money-financed fiscal stimulus. In this section we compare this optimal policy mix
with the case of optimal monetary policy, when government spending is kept constant. This
analysis allows to appreciate the role of the fiscal stimulus in the optimal policy mix.
20In Benigno and Nistico` (2017)[5] the increase of the liquidity premium gives rise to a redistribution effect
within the private sector.
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Figure 3.3: The role of government spending. IRFs under optimal monetary-government
spending policy (solid black line) and optimal monetary policy with constant fiscal policy (dashed
blue line) for a liquidity shock ξˆt with persistence ρ = 0.8. Variables are in percentage deviation
from the steady state, apart from the interest rate on reserves and the spread, that are is
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In this exercise, we assume that public spending is held fixed at its steady state value:
Gˆt = 0 ∀t. (3.45)
This implies that government spending is completely stabilized in the loss function (3.38). Now
the policymaker has only two variables of monetary policy to be used in order to stabilize the
economy. It can be noted the important role played by the fiscal stimulus: in presence of this,
the economy experiences a lower fall in output and inflation (see Figure 3.3). Output declines by
around one-half of the amount under optimal unconventional monetary policy. Inflation declines
to a lesser extent and then stabilizes completely one quarter before the case of monetary policy
alone.
It is crucial the role played by government spending which increases in the shock period and
subsequently reverts to the steady state. As previously discussed, it is remarkable that the
policymaker uses a fiscal stimulus despite this is costly, as can be seen in the loss function
(3.39). 21. To emphasise further this result we evaluate the loss function under both the cases
21Notice that when government spending is kept fixed at the first best level, that is when condition (3.45)
is satisfied, the loss function loses the second term, which disappears, and the in the first term we can use
Yˆt = CˆtThus, loss function in this case is:
Lt ≡ λc(Yˆt)2 + η(Yˆt)2 + λpi(pit)2.
of optimal policy and optimal monetary policy alone, namely under the case characterized by
(3.45). In Table 3.3 emerges that under the optimal policy mix loss function is largely smaller
Loss (%)
Optimal Policy 0.0240
Gˆt = 0 0.2027
Table 3.3: Loss function value under optimal monetary-government spending policy and under
optimal monetary policy with constant government spending.
than in case in which government spending is maintained on target.
As for the other policy variables, we observe that the expansion of monetary base occurs to
a larger extent than in the optimal monetary-government spending policy. Thus, an optimal
money-financed fiscal stimulus implies that the injection of monetary base can be less important
than in case of unconventional monetary policy with no role for government spending.
Another key feature stems from the path of interest rate on reserves: remarkably, in case of
fiscal stimulus accompanied by monetary expansion, the stay at the zero lower bound becomes
shorter. We can therefore argue that a money-financed fiscal stimulus leads to an earlier exit
from the zero lower bound.
Overall, this exercise has shown that a money-financed fiscal stimulus enables to stabilize the
economy in a more efficient way than an optimal unconventional monetary policy with no role
for government spending.
3.3.4 The sub-optimality of debt-financing the fiscal stimulus
We further stress the role of the optimal money-financed fiscal stimulus, comparing this optimal
policy with a policy regime in which the stimulus is not financed with money but only with public
debt. In this exercise we therefore assume that monetary policymaker is completely ”passive”,
keeping unchanged the amount of nominal reserves and the interest rate paid on them. As a
result, policymaker can only use government bonds and their interest rate to accommodate a
liquidity shock.
Hence, we call the ”debt-financing” regime a regime in which:
• Mt = M ∀t.
• imt = im ∀t.
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regime. IRFs for a 3.5% liquidity shock ξˆt with persistence ρ = 0.8. Variables are in percentage
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where M and im are the steady state value of nominal reserves and interest rate on reserves22.
. The underlying assumption in this regime is that central bank can target the interest rate on
reserves by implementing open market operations, even though the amount of money is kept
unvaried. This implies that in each period government bonds purchased by central bank BCt
adjust in accordance with imt = i
m23. Therefore, the government is now forced to issue public
debt to the private sector to finance public spending.
Figures 3.4-3.5 show what happens in this scenario of ”fully” passive monetary policy under
a 3.5% liquidity shock. Notice that, since nominal money is kept constant, nominal public
debt soars progressively, to more than 20% (see Figure 3.5). Moreover, the interest rate on
government bonds is now raised to a very large extent, so that liquidity premium increases
substantially. Because of both the missing role of money in restoring liquidity and the fact that
the interest rate on reserves cannot be cut, the policymaker is forced to increase the interest on
bonds24.
22The case in which the interest rate on bonds is targeted and no money is used is shown ahead in the paper
(Figure 3.9).
23This regime is different from the ”debt-financing” regime adopted in Gal`ı (2017)[30]. He considers a regime
in which central bank commits to a rule such that inflation is fully targeted in every period, that is pit = 0,
and money is adjusted endogenously. We call instead this regime ”inflation targeting”, as we will see in the
next section. With ”debt-financing” regime instead we mean that money is not used at all, and so is kept fixed.
Notice also that an important difference with Gal`ı (2017)[30] is that in our paper we have two monetary policy
instruments, rather than one.
24As discussed above, an increase of the liquidity premium implies also that households are provided with more
resources to purchase goods in the next period, when the goods market will be open again.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal monetary-government spending policy vs. ”debt financing”
regime. IRF of the price level for a 1%liquidity shock with persistence ρ = 0.8. Price level is
expressed in percentage variation from the steady state.
Importantly, in the ”debt-financing” regime the liquidity shock brings about a larger deflation
and a long-lasting recession. As to the former, inflation reaches around -0.2% on impact and
then starts increasing, overshooting the target some quarter later. Further, Figure 3.5 displays
that the price level experiences a larger and persistent decline. On the other hand, output
declines by around 3% and then increases, but overall falls considerably short of the potential
level. Therefore, it is unambiguously clear that under the debt-financing regime a liquidity shock
is both recessionary and deflationary.
It can be noted that when the policymaker is not allowed to use money to finance public
spending the optimal intervention with government spending becomes more pronounced, as
public spending has to rise to a larger extent. Surprisingly, after this larger increase, government
spending is taken back to a level below the target, implying a flawed stabilization of this.
Finally, Table 3.4 shows that the ”debt-financing” regime implies a larger than 1% welfare loss.
To sum up, we note that when the fiscal stimulus is financed with issuance of debt instead
Loss (%)
Optimal Policy 0.0240
Debt-financing 1.6014
Table 3.4: Loss function value under optimal monetary-government spending policy and under
”debt-financing” regime.
of money, the liquidity shock leads to a long-lasting recession and a sharp deflation. Both net
public debt and the interest rate paid on government bonds increase significantly to finance a
larger fiscal stimulus and to restore the liquidity deteriorated.
3.4 Taylor Rule, Inflation Targeting, GDP targeting
with a money-financed fiscal stimulus
In the previous section we first illustrated that the optimal policy mix in this framework in-
volves a money-financed fiscal stimulus. Then, we went on showing that this optimal policy
markedly outperforms a debt-financed fiscal stimulus, where reserves and their policy rate are
kept constant. This latter policy can be labelled a ”passive” monetary policy, to emphasise the
fact the monetary policy instruments (like money and the policy rate) are not allowed to vary
and therefore impact on the model equilibrium dynamics.
In this section we study the case of ”active” monetary policies, where central bank deliberately
uses its instruments to achieve a particular target. Therefore, we will demonstrate that these
policies perform well when the active monetary policy is combined with an optimally imple-
mented fiscal stimulus, such that the joint policy is in fact configured as a money-financed fiscal
stimulus.
3.4.1 Taylor Rule
Since its proposal by John B. Taylor in 1993, a milestone in the vast majority of models with
nominal rigidities is the Taylor rule. Because it has approximated fairly well post-war data,
this policy has been widely used as a benchmark to study optimal monetary policy in different
models. We characterize the ”Taylor rule” regime in this way:
• imt = φpipit ∀t.
• it = i ∀t.
with φpi = 1.5. Thus, we assume that policy rate i
m
t reacts positively to the changes in infla-
tion, according to the well-known Taylor principle. Further, to ensure the determinacy of the
equilibrium we impose that the response is more than one-to-one (see Woodford (2003) [79]).
As for the other monetary policy instrument, we assume that the interest rate on government
bonds remains at the steady state.
Figure 3.6 displays the responses under the Taylor rule regime and optimal government spending
(solid black line). Importantly, to highlight the role of this latter we report also the responses
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Figure 3.6: Taylor Rule regime: optimal government spending vs. model without
government spending.IRFs of main variables for a 1%liquidity shock with persistence ρ=0.8.
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when government spending is constant (circled blue line)25. In this latter case, a liquidity shock
draws a scenario that, ignoring the size of the variables’ deviation, resembles the one really oc-
curred after the crisis. Indeed, we can observe that, absent government spending, the liquidity
shocks leads to sharp recession and a prolonged deflation. In particular, the liquidity shock
drives to a 4% fall in output, which ameliorates the following period but never returns to the
target level in the period displayed. Similarly, inflation drops by 0.2% and remains persistently
in negative territory. As a consequence, the interest rate on reserves is cut down until the zero
lower bound becomes a constraint. The commitment to a Taylor rule implies that the interest
rate stays at the zero lower bound for three quarters. As a consequence, the liquidity premium
goes up. Thus, the expansion of monetary base is not only an outcome of the optimal monetary
policy, but is also implicated by an ”active” monetary policy, like the Taylor rule.
Importantly, when the model features optimal government spending the Taylor rule (dashed
red line with asterisks) regime performs unambiguously better, because the output gap is closed
after only one period and inflation remains anchored to the target throughout. Hence, the role of
government spending in complementing the ”active” monetary policy so as to minimise output
gap and deflation is decisive.
The striking feature lies in that when the standard Taylor rule is accompanied with an optimal
fiscal stimulus the performance in terms of stabilization of macroeconomic variables is as good
25In the model without government spending we adjust the steady state value of transfer-to-GDP to preserve
the same steady state.
as in the case of the optimal policy (solid black line), as can be seen by the perfect coincidence
of the responses in the two cases. Most noticeably, because of the money-financed fiscal stim-
ulus successfully prevents deflation to happen, the Taylor rule does not call for a reduction of
the policy rate, and thus, in contrast with optimal policy, the ZLB does not pose a constraint.
Therefore, this result highlights the powerful role of the money-financed fiscal stimulus in sta-
bilizing the economy, which does not hinge on cutting the policy rate until the ZLB binds. As
we will discuss next, this result is common with other ”active” monetary policies.
3.4.2 Inflation-targeting
The fact that optimal government spending improves the effectiveness of an ”active” monetary
policy in stabilizing inflation and output can be appreciated also when monetary policy is con-
figured as an ”inflation-targeting” policy. In this exercise, we refer to ”inflation-targeting” as a
regime in which central banks seeks to achieve full price stability:
• pit = 0 ∀t.
• it = i ∀t.
Further, we assume that in this regime the interest rate on bonds is kept fixed at the steady
state. Thus, in this ”active” monetary policy regime central bank may nonetheless steer the
interest rate on reserves to achieve inflation targeting. As a consequence, the zero lower bound
can potentially become a binding constraint26.
Figure 3.7 displays impulse response functions under optimal monetary-government spending
policy in comparison with the case of optimal government spending policy combined with a
monetary policy under ”inflation-targeting” regime. As in the Taylor rule regime, to achieve
full inflation-targeting central bank undergoes a sizeable and enduring balance-sheet expansion.
Surprisingly, it clearly comes out that when this policy is combined with the optimal fiscal stim-
ulus, delivers a satisfying stabilization. In fact, under this regime output is almost completely
stabilized, denoting a better performance than optimal policy if one has to only look to the out-
put gap. However, as observed also in the Taylor rule regime, the counterpart is the behaviour
of government spending: under ”inflation-targeting” government spending has to increase to a
larger extent than under optimal policy. Thus, it seem that, in order to pursue a policy of zero
inflation, the policymaker commits to a large one-time fiscal stimulus, which is financed by an
endogenous persistent balance-sheet expansion27. Importantly, with this policy in place, the
26Notice that the assumption of targeting the interest rate on bonds is not critical: results that follow hold
even in the case in which central bank targets the interest rate on reserves. These are available upon request.
27By contrast, in Gal`ı (2017)[30] a policy of inflation-targeting (called ”debt-financing is his paper) leads to an
endogenous reduction of money.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal monetary-government spending policy vs. ”inflation targeting”
regime. IRFs of main variables for a 1%liquidity shock with persistence ρ = 0.8. Variables are
in percentage deviation from the steady state, apart from the interest rate on reserves and the
spread, that are expressed in annual percentage points.
increase in government spending perfectly makes up for the reduction in consumption caused by
the liquidity shock, so that real output remains very close to potential output. In other words,
the fall in private spending (consumption) is compensated by the increase in public spending.
A compelling feature of this ”active” monetary policy is the fact that the interest rate on reserves
is not cut, but rather remains quite stable. This implies that, when the policymaker can rely on
a money-financed fiscal stimulus, is not forced to accommodate the liquidity shock by cutting
the policy rate. Remarkably, this is a common feature with the policy of targeting nominal
output, as we will show next.
Hence, the exercise of this section reveals that inflation-targeting policy enables to stabilize
output gap extremely well when government and central bank coordinate so as to implement
a money-financed fiscal stimulus involving a one-quarter above-target fiscal stimulus together
with a prolonged monetary base expansion.
3.4.3 Nominal GDP Targeting
We now investigate the behaviour of another ”active” monetary policy: the policy of targeting
nominal output. This policy is based on an old idea (Meade (1978)[54]), which has now regained
a broad support in the midst of the post-crisis recession28. According to the theory, this sort
of active monetary policy is particularly recommended when central banks lose their power
28See, among the others, Sumner (2012) [72], Woodford (2012)[80] and references therein.
to influence the economy through movements of the policy rate. One of the key advantage is
therefore the fact that the policymaker can pursue its policy regardless of the level of the interest
rate. In other words, targeting nominal output would be (close to) optimal, irrespective of the
economy being in a liquidity trap or not. Thus, we configure the ”nominal GDP targeting”
regime in this way:
• PtYt = PY ∀t.
• it = i ∀t.
We show the responses obtained under this policy in Figure 3.8. Remarkably, we observe that
targeting nominal output delivers an excellent stabilization of inflation. However, as in case of
inflation targeting, this occurs at the expense of a much larger fiscal stimulus: the increase in
government spending amounts to 2% in our simulation, doubling the increase in the case of our
optimal monetary-government spending policy. Likewise, the increase in government spending
exactly offsets the fall in consumption caused by the liquidity shock and the interest rate on
reserves remains quite stable, without being taken to the zero lower bound.29. Thus, steering the
policy rate turns out to be unnecessary when the policymaker is allowed to implement a money-
financed fiscal stimulus. It is ultimately required that a balance-sheet expansion is accompanied
by a larger increase in public spending.
To stress further that the excellent stabilization of inflation is due to the implementation of the
money-financed fiscal stimulus, rather than cutting the policy rate, in Figure 3.9 we consider a
regime in which central bank targets both nominal GDP and the interest rate on reserves. We
plot this policy together with the case of a regime in which central bank keeps the amount of
money unchanged and targets the interest rate on bonds, so that the interest rate on reserves
can eventually be lowered. Clearly, this latter policy entails that the fiscal stimulus can only
be financed with public debt. It is remarkable the role played by the injection of monetary
base: in fact, when this is not allowed, inflation, nominal output and public spending diverge
considerably from their target, and the interest rate on reserves stays at zero level for very long
time.
Hence, we argue that an ”active” policy of targeting nominal output performs strikingly well for
the stabilization of inflation. This occurs because the one-time increase in government spending,
which is coupled with a persistent increase in money supply, becomes more pronounced in order
to counteract the large fall in consumption. Importantly, this policy is not dependent on a
reduction of the interest rate on reserves.
29In Benigno and Nistico` (2017)[5] nominal GDP targeting is optimal, but the interest rate on reserves is lowered
until the zero lower bound.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
We have analysed the optimal mix of monetary policy and government spending policy in an
economy hit by a liquidity shock, which brings about a fall in both output and inflation, and
pushes the policy rate to the zero lower bound. It turns out that optimal policy prescribes a
money-financed fiscal stimulus, which is capable of stabilizing completely the economy quite
shortly. Thus, in our general equilibrium framework it is found that, for a given level of public
debt, it is optimal for the policymaker financing a fiscal stimulus with purchase of public debt
from the private sector, so that the amount of public debt in private hands reduces whereas
money supply instead grows. In other words, the optimal commitment would be to ”monetise”
the increase in deficit brought about by the expansionary fiscal policy.
Crucial in the paper is the the aspect of the optimal money-financed fiscal stimulus, which
entails a one-time countercyclical fiscal stimulus accompanied by a central bank’s balance-sheet
expansion. Importantly, the increase of money is not withdrawn at the same time of the fiscal
stimulus, but instead is maintained in the financial system with large persistence, implying a
slow tapering from the uncoventional monetary policy.
A money-financed fiscal stimulus affects also the optimal conduct of the interest rate object
of monetary policy. It turns out that when optimal policy is in form of a money-financed
fiscal stimulus, the exit from the zero lower bound occurs earlier than in case of an optimal
unconventional monetary policy without the support of government spending.
The comparison of the optimal money-financed fiscal stimulus with the policy of financing the
stimulus with public debt is striking: when optimal government spending is entirely financed by
public debt (so that monetary policy is completely ”passive”) the economy experiences a long-
lasting recession and deflation, and stabilization of output and inflation becomes problematic.
By contrast, when money supply increases so as to support ”active” monetary policies, like
the standard Taylor rule, ”inflation-targeting” and ”nominal GDP targeting” results change
significantly. In this case, as long as the ”active” monetary policy is complemented with an
optimal fiscal stimulus the stabilization is astonishingly improved. In particular, a standard
Taylor rule attains as an efficient stabilization as the joint optimal policy. When ”inflation-
targeting” or ”nominal GDP targeting” are in place, stabilization of, respectively, output gap and
inflation are greatly attained even without lowering the interest rate, although the policymaker
is forced to exert a large fiscal expansion that, however, is shortly withdrawn.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Competitive equilibrium
Here we lay out a summary of all equilibrium conditions needed to characterize the competitive
equilibrium of the model.
Savers’ equilibrium conditions are given by:
Γszt
Cst − γsCst−1
= βsRtEt
[
Γszt+1
(Cst+1 − γsCst )Πt+1
]
(A.1)
(N st )
ψ(Cst − γsCst−1)
Γs
= wst (A.2)
ΓsQt
Cst − γsCst−1
=
jt
(H¯ −Hbt )
+ βsEt
[
ΓsQt+1zt+1
(Cst+1 − γsCst )zt
]
= 0 (A.3)
Γszt
Cst − γsCst−1
qkt = βsEt
[
Γszt+1
Cst+1 − γsCst
((Rkt+1 + q
k
t+1)
]
(A.4)
atq
k
t
Γszt
Cst − γsCst−1
(
1− φ∆It
I
)
=
Γszt
Cst − γsCst−1
− βsEt
[
Γszt+1
Cst+1 − γsCst
at+1q
k
t+1
φ∆It+1
I
]
(A.5)
where in equation (A.3) we have substituted the housing market clearing condition. Capital
accumulation equation is written as:
Kt = at
(
It − φ
2
(
It − It−1
I
)2)
+ (1− δ)Kt−1. (A.6)
Equilibrium conditions for borrowers are:
Γbzt
Cbt − γbCbt−1
(1− ωt) = βbEt
[
ΓbRtzt+1
(Cbt+1 − γbCbt )Πt+1
]
(A.7)
(N bt )
ψ(Cbt − γbCbt−1)
Γb
= wbt (1 + (1− γ)τωt) (A.8)
ΓbQt
Cbt − γbCbt−1
(1− (1− γ)mωt) = jt
Hbt
+ βbEt
[
ΓbQt+1zt+1
(Cbt+1 − γbCbt )zt
]
= 0. (A.9)
Borrowers’ budget constraint is:
Cbt +Qt(H
b
t −Hbt−1) = bbt −
bbt−1Rt−1
Πt
+ wbtN
b
t , (A.10)
and the borrowing constraint:
bbt ≤ γmQtHbt + (1− γ)τwbtN bt (A.11)
holding with equality if ωt > 0.
As for the supply side of our economy, we can rewrite equation (2.24) in recursive way by defining
two additional variables Ft and Lt, so that:
(
1− θ (Πt
Π¯
)t−1
1− θ
) 1
t−1
=
Ft
Lt
(A.12)
Ft =
ΓsYt
Cst − γsCst−1
+ θβsEt
{
Ft+1 (Πt+1)
t−1
}
(A.13)
Lt =
t
t − 1
ΓsYtMCt
Cst − γsCst−1
+ θβsEt {Lt+1 (Πt+1)t} (A.14)
MCt =
W st N
s
t /Pt
(1− α)χ∆tYt (A.15)
MCt =
W btN
b
t /Pt
(1− α)(1− χ)∆tYt (A.16)
MCt =
RktKt−1
α∆tYt
(A.17)
using the definitions of aggregate labor and capital. Price dispersion evolves as:
∆t = θ
(
Πt
Π¯
)t
∆t−1 + (1− θ)
(
1− θ (Πt
Π¯
)t−1
1− θ
) t
t−1
. (A.18)
By equalizing aggregate production function and resource constraint we get:
∆tYt = K
α
t
(
(N st )
χ
(
N bt
)1−χ)(1−α)
(A.19)
Finally, resource constraint is given by:
Yt = C
s
t + C
b
t + It. (A.20)
Therefore, we can now characterize the competitive equilibrium of the model. Assuming exoge-
nous stochastic processes {ζt, jt, at, zt, t}∞t=0 a competitive equilibrium of the baseline model is
a set of stochastic processes
{
Yt, C
b
t , C
s
t , H
b
t , N
s
t , N
b
t , b
b
t , w
s
t , w
b
t , ωt, qt, Q
k
t , Ft, Lt,∆t,MCt,Πt, R
k
t ,Kt, It
}
given initial value of variables
{
Cb−1, Cs−1, Hb−1, bb−1∆−1,K−1, I−1, R−1
}
and a rule of monetary
policy {Rt}∞t=0 specified by equation (2.26), so that equations (A.1)-(A.20) are all contempora-
neously satisfied.
A.2 Data and observation equations
All data series are quarterly, with range 1991:3 - 2005:4. Series are all retrieved from the FRED
website.
• Real consumption. Real personal consumption expenditure, chained 2009 dollars, logged.
Series ”PCECC96”.
Model variable: C˜t = (Ct/C)− 1.
• Nominal short-term interest rate. Effective Federal Funds Rate, annualized percent,
divided by 400 to express in quarterly units, then logged. Series ”FEDFUNDS”.
Model variable: R˜t = Rt −R.
• Inflation. Log difference of the implicit price deflator. Series ”GDPDEF”.
Model variable: Π˜t = log (Πt/Π).
• Real Home Prices. Standard and Poor/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index
(series ”CSUSHPINSA”), deflated by the GDP deflator and then logged.
Model variable: Q˜t = (Qt/Q)− 1.
• Investment. Real private fixed investment: Nonresidential (chain-type quantity index),
series ”B008RG3Q086SBEA”, seasonally adjusted, logged.
Model variable: I˜t = (It/I)− 1.
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Figure A.1: Raw data of model observables. 1991:3 - 2005:4.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Log-linear model
In this section we report the log-linear equations that characterize the model. They are obtained
by approximating the non-linear equilibrium conditions (3.29)-(3.37) around the non-stochastic
efficient steady state.
Imposing Π = 1 and taking a log-linear approximation of (3.29)-(3.30) we obtain:
iˆt − iˆmt +
i− im
1 + im
Etξˆt+1 = Λ
[
λcEt(Cˆt+2 − Cˆt+1) + Etpit+2 − Etiˆmt+1
]
. (B.1)
where pit ≡ log(Πt), iˆt ≡ log((1 + it)/(1 + i)), iˆmt ≡ log((1 + imt )/(1 + im)), ˆξt+1 ≡ (ξt+1 −
ξ)/(1 − ξ), Cˆt ≡ (Ct − C)/Y , Λ = (1 − ξ)β(1 + i), λc ≡ σY/C and all variables without the
subscript are steady state variables.
On the supply side, we obtain a variation of the standard linear New Keynesian Phillips curve:
pit = κ
[
(λc + η)Yˆt − λcGˆt
]
+ κ
[
λcEt(Cˆt+1 − Cˆt) + Etpit+1 − iˆmt
]
+ βEtpit+1. (B.2)
with Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y ), Gˆt ≡ (Gt−G)/Y and κ ≡ (1−θ)(1−θβ)/((1+η)θ). The cash-in-advance
constraint in log-linear terms becomes:
ϑm
(
mˆt−1
my
+ iˆmt−1
)
+ ξϑb
(
bˆt−1
by
+ iˆt−1
)
+ (1− ξ)ϑbξˆt = Cˆt + (ϑm + ξϑb)pit (B.3)
defining mˆt ≡ (mt −m)/Y , my = m/Y , by = b/Y , ϑb ≡ by(1 + i), ϑm ≡ my(1 + im).
The resource constraint is:
Yˆt = Cˆt + Gˆt (B.4)
whereas the government-central bank budget constraint:
Gˆt + τ Yˆt = bˆt − bˆt−1(1 + i) + mˆt − mˆt−1(1 + im)− ϑbiˆt−1 − ϑmiˆmt−1 + (ϑb + ϑm)pit. (B.5)
Therefore, an equilibrium in the log-linear model consists in a sequence of variables
{
Yˆt, Cˆt, pit, iˆt, iˆ
m
t , mˆt, bˆt, Gˆt
}
satisfying equations (B.1)-(B.5), given the exogenous stochastic process (3) for ξˆt and with three
policy variables to be specified.
B.2 Derivation loss function
We need to prove how the loss function (3.39) is derived. First, recall that in the efficient steady
state the following conditions hold:
C−σ = ωgG−σ
g
= Y η (B.6)
By approximating (3.38) up to a second order we get:
Ut = U+
[
C−σ(Ct − C)− σ
2
C−σ−1(Ct − C)2
]
+ ωg
[
G−σ
g
(Gt −G)− σ
g
2
G−σ
g−1(Gt −G)2
]
−
[
Y η(Yt − Y ) + η
2
Y η−1(Yt − Y )2
]
− Y
1+η
1 + η
(∆t − 1) + t.i.p.+O (||ξt||)3
where it must be noted that ∆t is already of second-order.
This equation can be simplified to get:
Ut = U+C
−σ
[
(Ct − C)− σ
2
C−1(Ct − C)2
]
+ ωgG
−σg
[
(Gt −G)− σ
g
2
G−1(Gt −G)2
]
− Y η
[
(Yt − Y ) + η
2
Y −1(Yt − Y )2
]
− Y
1+η
1 + η
(∆t − 1) + t.i.p.+O (||ξt||)3 .
For a generic variable Zt we have:
Zt = Z
(
1 + Zˆt + Zˆt
2
)
+O (||ξt||)3
with Zˆt ≡ log(Zt/Z). Thus, we can obtain:
Ut = U + Y
1+η
[
−σs
−1
c
2
(Cˆt)
2 − σ
gs−1g
2
(Gˆt)
2 − η
2
(Yˆt)
2
]
− Y
1+η
1 + η
(∆t − 1) + t.i.p.+O (||ξt||)3
where sc ≡ C/Y , sg ≡ G/Y and we have used condition (51) and the resource constraint (3.36).
We now approximate (3.35) and then integrate it across time to yield:
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0∆ˆt =
θ
(1− θ)(1− θβ)(1 + η)(1 + η)
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
(pit)
2
2
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξt||)3 .
Finally, we obtain our quadratic loss function:
Wt0 = −
Y 1+η
2
Et
{ ∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
λc(Cˆt)
2 + λg(Gˆt)
2 + η(Yˆt)
2 + λpi(pit)
2
]}
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξt||)3
with:
λc ≡ σs−1c
λg ≡ σgs−1g
λpi ≡ 
κ
.
B.3 Ramsey problem
Here we report the Ramsey problem under full commitment. We assume therefore that initial
values of Lagrange multipliers are their steady state value.
The full problem is set up in the following way:
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{[
λc(Cˆt)
2 + λg(Gˆt)
2 + η(Yˆt)
2 + λpi(pit)
2
]
+
λ1,t
(
iˆt − iˆmt +
i− im
1 + im
Etξˆt+1 − Λ
[
λcEt(Cˆt+2 − Cˆt+1) + Etpit+2 − Etiˆmt+1
])
+
λ2,t
(
κ
[
(λc + η)Yˆt − λcGˆt
]
+ κ
[
λcEt(Cˆt+1 − Cˆt) + Etpit+1 − iˆmt
]
+ βEtpit+1 − pit
)
+
λ3,t
(
ϑm
(
mˆt−1
my
+ iˆmt−1
)
+ ξϑb
(
bˆt−1
by
+ iˆt−1
)
+ (1− ξ)ϑbξˆt − Cˆt − (ϑm + ξϑb)pit
)
+
λ4,t
(
bˆt − bˆt−1(1 + i) + mˆt − mˆt−1(1 + im)− ϑbiˆt−1 − ϑmiˆmt−1 + (ϑb + ϑm)pit − Gˆt − τ Yˆt
)
+
+λ5,t
(
iˆmt + log(1 + i
m)
)}
.
Hence, given the exogenous stochastic process for ξˆt a Ramsey optimal policy solves for the set
of variables
{
Yˆt, Cˆt, pit, iˆt, iˆ
m
t , mˆt, bˆt, Gˆt
}∞
t=0
and Lagrange multipliers {λ1,t, λ2,t, λ3,t, λ4,t, λ5,t}∞t=0.
B.4 Robustness: the case of wasteful government spend-
ing
A fascinating result of the analysis laid out so far is that complementing an ”active” monetary
policy, which involves a balance sheet expansion, with an optimal fiscal stimulus delivers a great
stabilization of output and inflation. In this regard, a key feature of the model described in
section 3.2 is the presence of government spending in the utility function. In fact, assuming that
government provides utility to the representative agent implies that the Ramsey policymaker
has also the objective of stabilizing government spending around the target level, which in our
model corresponds to the first best1. However, we showed that policymaker makes large use of
deviation of government spending from the target in order to reduce the gap of other variables,
like output and inflation.
We can now show that this result is even more pronounced when the fiscal stimulus is not
”costly” for the policymaker, in the sense that pushing public spending above the target does
not directly increase the value of the loss function. Therefore, we relax the assumption of
the presence of government spending in the utility function, assuming instead that government
spending is wasteful. In Figure B.1 we plot the responses of the optimal policy under this
last scenario together with the optimal policy described in the previous sections. It is evident
that when government spending is not in the utility function the policymaker can fully stabilize
output and inflation by implementing a money-financed fiscal stimulus. The reason is simple:
in this case expanding government spending far above the steady state level is not costly for
the policymaker, so that government spending can be pushed up to the point such that output
gap remains closed. Equivalently, the increase of government spending fully offsets the fall in
consumption caused by the sudden liquidity shortage. Interestingly enough, when government
spending is not in the utility function the interest rate on reserves never reaches the zero bound2.
1This can be clearly seen in the loss function (3.39).
2Also the arguments for supporting ”active” monetary policies, discussed in the main text, are robust to a
model characterization in which government spending does not enter utility function. Details of these simulations
are available upon request.
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Figure B.1: Optimal policy: wasteful vs. useful government spending.IRFs of main
variables for a 1%liquidity shock with persistence ρ=0.8. Variables are in percentage deviation
from the steady state, apart from the interest rate on reserves and the spread, that are expressed
in annual percentage points.
B.5 Sensitivity analysis
B.5.1 The role of price rigidities
The model described in section 3.2 is a New Keynesian model augmented with a financial
friction, like the cash-in-advance constraint, and a role for central banking. It is well-known
that main feature of the class of New Keynesian models is given by price rigidity, which affects
the transmission of policies and introduces the trade-off between stabilization of output gap and
inflation. Thus, we now investigate how the effect of the optimal money-financed fiscal stimulus
depends on different degrees of price rigidity. In the baseline calibration we have set θ = 0.75,
implying that the average duration of prices is four quarters. In Figure B.2 we consider also the
case of an average duration of three quarters (θ = 0.66) and an average of ten quarters (θ =
0.90).
The optimal response of the policy variables is the same in all the three cases considered. In
particular, public spending rises by around 1% and then returns to the steady state level the
following period. Money supply goes up by 2% and then reverts back in a way symmetric to
the liquidity process, whereas the interest rate on reserves stays at the zero lower bound for one
more quarter after the shock. Furthermore, output gap reports the same path under the three
cases considered.
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Figure B.2: Optimal unconventional monetary-government spending policy for dif-
ferent frequency of price adjustment. IRFs of main variables for a 1%liquidity shock with
persistence ρ = 0.8. Variables are in percentage deviation from the steady state, apart from the
interest rate on reserves, which is expressed in annual percentage points.
What changes significantly is the response of inflation: importantly, when prices are more rigid
inflation is much closer to the target level (price stability). This is a consequence of the fact
that a lower θ implies that the cost of inflation in the loss function has a smaller weight and
therefore the policymaker can afford a larger deviation of inflation. The bottom line is that the
stabilization effect of the money-financed fiscal stimulus is more effective the more prices are
rigid.
B.5.2 The role of steady state debt-to-GDP ratio
In some country where unconventional monetary policies are being largely implemented, one
general concern is the high level of public debt. This is, for instance, the case of Japan, where
fiscal policy has been carefully restrained because of diffuse concerns about the outstanding
level of its public debt. In the analysis developed so far we have assumed that the steady state
amount of net public debt-to-GDP amounts to 60%, as in Gal`ı (2017)[30]3. However, it might
be of interest analysing the case of different value of net public debt-to-GDP, so as to consider
also the case of a very large amount of debt, like in Japan today4.
In this regard, in Figure ?? we report impulse response functions under optimal monetary-
government spending policy for different steady state levels of net public debt-to-GDP. In com-
parison with the calibrated value of 60% we consider a low value of 20% and a very high value
3Recall that this is public debt issued to private sector, ruling out the share of public debt held by central
bank.
4These change are obtained by slightly varying the amount of the steady state lump-sum tax T¯ .
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Figure B.3: Optimal monetary-government spending policy with different steady
state value of net public debt-to-GDP. IRFs of main variables for a 1%liquidity shock with
persistence ρ=0.8. Variables are in percentage deviation from the steady state, apart from the
interest rate on reserves and the spread, that are expressed in annual percentage points.
of 120%, as in Japan today. It turns out that the level of net public debt in steady state affects
substantially the conduct of the optimal monetary-government spending policy. In particular,
it can be observed that when the level of public debt-to-GDP is high, the economy experiences
a more sizeable fall in output and inflation. This occurs because the liquidity shock impacts on
a larger portion of assets.
Importantly, this leads to a stronger response of the policymaker, that is forced to implement
more important increase in public spending and monetary base expansion. Furthermore, the
stay at the zero lower bound becomes longer, the larger is the steady state value of net public
debt. Interestingly enough, in case of 20% level of net public debt the interest rate on reserves
does not reach the zero level and a much smaller money-financed fiscal stimulus is required to
stabilize output gap and inflation.
To sum up, the long-run value of net public debt-to-GDP is an important variable for the ef-
fectiveness of a money-financed fiscal stimulus in stabilizing the economy. When public debt is
high, output gap and inflation deviate from the target to a larger extent, and therefore a more
pronounced money-financed fiscal stimulus is needed, along with a longer stay at the zero lower
bound.
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Figure B.4: η = 1 vs. η = 5. IRFs of main variables for a 1%liquidity shock with persistence
ρ=0.8. Variables are in percentage deviation from the steady state, apart from the interest rate
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B.5.3 The role of the inverse of Frisch elasticity
A controversial parameter in the monetary economics’ literature is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity, captured by the parameter η in the model of this paper. In our baseline calibration
this value is set equal to 1, as in Justiniano et al. (2015)[41], among the many others. However,
in the literature it is also assumed that this value can take an higher value, implying that labor
supply becomes less elastic to changes in real wage. Thus, Figure B.4 displays the case of
η = 1, as in our calibration with the case η = 5, as in Gal`ı (2017)[30]. It can be seen that
varying this parameter is not irrelevant: in case of η = 5, the economy experiences a smaller
contraction in output and inflation, which, however, is accommodated by a stronger response of
the policymaker, involving a longer stay at the ZLB and a more pronounced fiscal stimulus. The
reason has to do with the weight assigned to output gap in the loss function that the policymaker
is trying to minimize. An higher value of η implies that the policymaker cares about output gap
to a much larger extent, so that she becomes very willing to engage in a stronger money-financed
fiscal stimulus, with the aim of ultimately reducing the output gap.
